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INCREASE IN GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURES EXPLAINED

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Flemish 11 Aug 80 p 2

[Article by JB]

[Text] Next year the state will disburse about 1.36 trillion francs, about 1.2 trillion for consumable goods and benefits and 160 billion for investments. The total public expenditures, including social security and local government spending, are bound to be in the neighborhood of 2 trillion francs (2 thousand billion). The national debt, including budgeted debt, will exceed that amount one of these days.

In 1960 the total public expenditures were hardly a tenth of that amount, namely 196 billion, or 34.3 percent of the then gross national product. That year the current state disbursements exceeded 10 billion for the first time. Even if we take account of the devaluation of the franc, as we should, the increase over the past 20 years is appallingly large. The public spending now represents about 54 percent of the GNP, which has greatly increased in the meantime.

And yet the successive governments all this time have been making seemingly desperate efforts to restrict the rise in spending, to judge by the bloody work that is attributed to the hatchet committees. For the crisis in public finances does not date from the past 5 years; in 1965 the budget was compared to a "train in the fog," and even in earlier decades there had been concern about the ratio of expenditures to revenues. To what must this evidently unstoppable increase in public expenditures be attributed?

The observation that government's tasks have increased in the course of decades and the percentage of the GNP that goes into public spending has increased as a result seems rather simplistic. Yet that explanation is generally accepted.

Santa Claus

Fifteen years ago, in an article under the title "La crise des finances publiques," BULLETIN SOCIAL DES INDUSTRIELS, January 1966, Mark Eyskens summed up five determining factors:

1. The aging of the population, coupled with a spontaneous or compulsory lengthening of school attendance. These two phenomena cause an inevitable rise in sectors ranging from health care and welfare to pensions and education.
2. The socialization of modern society.
3. The institutionalization of ideological and sociopolitical pluralism in Belgium. It is obvious, he wrote, that the existence of two competing educational systems raises the costs considerably. As further examples he cited the pluralism of the health insurance systems and the existence of two big trade unions frequently engaged in rivalry with each other.

"In the recent past," Eyskens wrote, "around a few key problems there has been a veritable escalation of intolerance, and, after the anticlimax of a compromise negotiated in detail, this was suddenly transformed as if by magic into a financial escalation with no abatement or end in sight. That was the case with the school question, with the organization of health care, and to some extent with the regulation of university expansion."

4. The institutionalization of the country's ethnic duality. According to him it is "obvious that the federalizing tendencies which take concrete form in decentralizations, deconcentrations, and duplications of all kinds definitely do not contribute to the reduction of the operating expenses of the administrations."

5. A last factor seems to him to be indissolubly linked with the democratic system, which is dominated by the competition between political parties. There is talk in that connection of demagoguery, of Santa Claus politics, designed to arouse the sympathy of the voters. In a certain sense this may be regarded as the "operating cost of democracy." It must be noted, Eyskens wrote, that as elections approach, budgetary orthodoxy is always abandoned. Carrying out campaign promises then leads to a batch of new (and often purely political) expenditures.

Promises

On 10 October 1975 Willy De Clercq, then minister of finance, gave his analysis in a speech at Ghent under the title "Where Does Tax Pressure Begin and End?"

1. The gradual realization of the principles of the welfare state, accompanied by accentuation of government's redistribution function and its market-regulating function and by the expansion of the collective goods and services made available by the state (usually below cost).

2. The inelasticity of public expenditures (their automatism; everything is laid down in laws and regulations). Examples: the [cost of living] indexing of the wages, salaries, and pensions paid out by the government and by subsidized institutions such as the universities; the index-determined benefits paid by social security, such as unemployment benefits and child allotments; the indexed subsidies to hospitals, public transportation companies, etc.
3. The aging of the population and the enormous expansion of the school population.
4. Our democratic form of government, in which the influence of pressure groups and catering to the voters cannot be avoided. (The taxes of today are the campaign promises of yesterday.)
5. The high costs of regionalization and decentralization in a small country like Belgium. The superposition of different levels of decision-making entails higher administrative operating costs, which are less compensated for in a small country by the effect of increased scale than in big countries.
6. Our tendency to burden the budget with all kinds of party, commonality, and ideological differences through expensive compromises.

In his analysis of the evolution of central government spending since 1919, published in the DOKUMENTATIEBLAD (Documentary Gazette) of the Ministry of Finance from November 1977 to August 1978, Stefaan Vandendriessche investigates the applicability to Belgium of a number of foreign theories (Peacock and Wiseman, Marchal, Wagner, Timm, and Galbraith). His own conclusion is that economic growth (together with inflation and the elasticity of tax revenues) created room for a profusion of socialized public finances, which took form in the increased public expenditures. According to him the spending explosion is also explained by the evolution toward a "business-running state," which has to bear the whole weight of the crisis, and toward the "great profitariat."

Pharisees

The National Bank also chastised the mentality of the population in a passage in its annual report of 1975 that has since become notorious:

"The last few decades have been characterized by a continuing expansion of the demand packages. Brought forward by all circles, by groups of all sorts of opinions, and by the press, which is their sounding-board, as well as by corporations and institutions of all kinds, these demands are directed toward collective expenditures; expansion of these expenditures is demanded in all sorts of forms, at the level of the central government and at the level of the various subordinate administrative divisions.

"And nothing is more convenient for everybody than, with a *pharisaical dialectic* under the cloak of orthodoxy, to expose the excessive

expenditures for the benefit of others, to demand increased taxes that fall upon others, and, conversely, to present a prettily decked out justification for the necessary or desirable increase in public expenditures that benefit 'everybody' himself.

"He finds the quality of the benefits extended to him free of charge by the state inadequate. If they benefit him, there are never too many exceptions to the general regulations in all administrative affairs, with expensive administrative and control offices as a result. He never finds fault with the government for creating too many new government jobs when he is lobbying for them. The community, represented by the authorities, is dreadfully stingy with redistributions of income and capital that it carries out, rightly or wrongly, to his advantage, when he is the rightful claimant as individual or as owner or as director of an enterprise, and whether it is a matter of health care, exports, sport, construction, scientific research, agriculture, recreation, trade, culture, land development, family policy, or sectoral policy, *every demand is justified and every rejection a scandal.*"

The neo-liberal economists, lastly, and especially the "public choice" school, frankly point to the political class and the public officials (the "bureaucracy") as the guilty parties, because they have an interest in more state. According to them, in the western democracies the political coalitions that stand for an increase in public spending are always much more powerful than any coalition of taxpayers that may oppose that increase.

8815
CSO: 3105

EDUCATION MINISTER WARNS ABOUT COSTS OF BILINGUAL EDUCATION

Brussels KNACK in Dutch 16 Jul 80 pp 26-27

[Interview with Minister of Education Willy Calewaert and his Chief of Staff Gaston Colebunders, by Johan Struye and Marc Reynebeau: "Our Last Heritage May Cost Money"; date and place of interview not given]

[Text] The only account in the budget, which more or less escaped the blunt axe of the budget cuts, is education -- good for 200 billion francs and nearly 300,000 jobs. However, the new minister of education, Willy Calewaert (SP [Belgian Socialist Party]) and his chief of staff, Gaston Colebunders (who will be leaving the department this fall), implied that education will not be able to avoid the problems of communarization and reform.

[Willy Calewaert] An additional credit of 2.1 billion francs had been requested, and we had to save 2.2 percent, which for our budget means 2.4 billion francs. Together, this meant that we had to save 4.5 billion francs. One of the goals of the government agreement was to maintain overall employment in education and also to apportion the means actually to be able to implement this, specifically 5 billion francs, by preference to be allocated to the Ministry of National Education. Of this sum, 2.9 billion went to the Flemish sector and 2.1 billion to the French sector. Subtracting 2.9 billion from 4.5 billion, left us 1.6 billion francs to find somewhere through savings. However, we are now faced with the situation that the budget for education is one of the smallest budgets in terms of the possibility of carrying out a policy. It is true that the Flemish sector now has a budget of 112 billion francs and the French sector 80 billion, but 89 percent of that budget represents wages, and an additional 3 to 4 percent is set aside for required expenditures, such as rent. Consequently, the margin is particularly small. We managed to find those 1.6 billion francs without touching employment. The savings involved will be relatively unnoticeable, because they were spread over all kinds of sectors.

[Question] In terms of employment, however, there is the problem of the number of students, which is affected by descending birth rate figures.

[Calewaert] The figures have started going up again in nursery school. Right now, there is a low point in primary education, which will be felt at the secondary level in a few years, but which will be partially counterbalanced by the extension of the school age, both downwards and upwards. In my opinion, the lowering of the school age -- which will now be set at 5 years of age -- should be pushed even further. It is a democratic measure, to remove cultural differences at the family level. It has been noted that elementary school children have to study 2 or 3 hours in the evening. I find that sickening, dreadful. But during those 3 hours, the children are assisted by their parents, who are able or not able to do this, parents who may or may not be able to afford a teacher to help their children. As far as I am concerned, this creates intollerable situations. Indeed, this causes differences starting in extreme youth, which cannot be eliminated later.

The lowering of the school age is a means to attempt to create an environment where there is a better chance -- through being in school -- to spot and remedy handicaps, if there are any, earlier.

[Question] It is organized society which gets involved somewhat earlier.

[Calewaert] Right. For that matter, I believe that it should be even earlier.

[Question] An obligation to go to nursery school?

[Calewaert] From my point of view, yes. But, first of all, there is a financial resistance to this. There is also resistance from certain parents, although I believe that the parents are more and more inclined to agree with it, now that the woman is being absorbed more in the labor process, etcetera. But the concrete proposal for this has not yet been made.

[Question] This problem of removing the socio-cultural lag may well be the sharpest for children of foreign workers.

[Calewaert] We have to deal relatively less with this than the French sector, even though in my home town of Berchem there are classes where only 2 or 3 of the children are Flemish. There are other places like this: Limburg, Ghent. The problem is equally acute in terms of assistance to these children during their first formative years.

[Gaston Colebunders] We have tried to work this out through BTK [expansion unknown] projects. Schools with a student population of more than 50 percent children of foreign workers will get different standards, with more personnel and thus smaller groups. That is and will remain so. Thus, there will be no economizing on the BTK projects: the minister has proposed to the Council of Ministers that these projects be extended. Savings are affected with regard to trainees. That is a special case, because they are only temporary. This involves recent graduates, who have not yet worked, who are not allowed to work on their own -- but only with the

regular teacher --, who only receive 90 percent of the wages and whose work days do not count in terms of receiving priority in the statutory system. We are going to economize in this area, in deliberation with the unions, who would rather see the extra jobs on a statutory basis -- just as we do, for that matter.

[Question] An extension of the school age also affects your budget, does it not?

[Colebunders] No, because you have to keep in mind that it is precisely during those years that the effect of lower birth rate will begin to be felt. It compensates for the lower birth rate and does not involve any extra expenditures either. Besides, there are not that many students who leave school at the age of 15.

[Question] How is cooperation between the two departments, yours and that of Deputy Minister Gaston Geens?

[Calewaert] In practice, this produces few difficulties. In the beginning, a great deal was written about this in the press, for example, concerning the Free University of Brussels [VUB] (editor: which, as a free institution, lies within the scope of Geens' authority). First of all, a university is only to a very small degree under the exclusive authority of a single minister, in the sense that on the budgetary level, for example, a university is completely standardized, even in terms of the number of students, degrees, structures, legislative measures which simply must be applied, where there is no choice, where no random measures can be implemented. On the one hand, financially speaking, universities are to a large degree regulated by law, and for the rest, a large part of the decisions which must be made according to the law are simply national ones, which require bills and where the two ministers of national education -- possibly with their deputies -- decide together. For that matter, this must go through the Council of Ministers.

Superminister

[Question] For the future, you would propose to provide a single superminister with two deputies for matters of education. Thus, a single senior minister who, in a future system of federalized education, would decree the standards, regulations and the like for the whole territory, with those responsible for execution in the communities.

[Calewaert] The constitution (Article 59b) lists a number of powers with regard to national education. Actually, I believe that this could develop a completely different character by the time the regional governments have stepped out of the government. At that point, the ministers of the communities in charge of education will get jurisdiction for their own community -- and thus, they could even be put in the minority, etcetera, while the other is responsible to parliament. This is a view which is only possible when a regionalized state exists.

[Question] Are you, in this perspective, also thinking about a review of the national school pact?

[Calewaert] Yes, we are going to look into that with a national school pact committee. At one time, VUB Rector Baert de Schutter proposed a shift to a regionalized school pact. There are possibilities there.

[Cleebunders] This would actually be contrary to the constitution, and if national education were to get enough autonomy with regard to the community ministers of education this would not be necessary. Everything depends on the extent to which national education can remain detached from the community executives. I do not know whether the free thinkers in the Flanders would have any advantage in a regionalized school pact. I doubt whether that protection would be any greater, not now, because there are tensions between the communities, but I wonder if 5 or 10 years from now, when those tensions have dimmed, it would not be better to maintain a unitary system.

[Calewaert] I do not share this pessimism completely, because 10 years from now we will be in a totally different situation in terms of state structures. A situation in which the real safeguard which we now find in that unitary state, in that unitary parliament, where the strong socialists from Wallonia oppose the strong CVF [Social Christian Party] in the Flanders, will be a thing of the past and where an agreement among the people belonging to communities will be more important. Indeed, it goes even further. The authority of a regulatory body over its schools plays a role here: whoever holds the power, also wants to exercise it.

[Question] The idea behind it is actually very deep: you, as socialists, want to take education out of the hands of private individuals and turn it into a social matter.

[Calewaert] That is true. I am convinced that the only serious investment a community can make is in education. This is particularly true for the European countries, which no longer have any raw materials at all. We must accomplish something in a technological or scientific area, otherwise we will be totally done for. That is the only heritage we have left over. In the past, we still had raw materials, which we /stole/ [in italics] from our colonies; now we have nothing left. If we have to make budget cuts, this means that we are no longer on top. A few weeks ago, I had to give a speech in the new provincial palace in Antwerp, which had been conceived in the sixties and is now completed. There is a Hollywood-like luxury about it, which would no longer be possible today -- and this over a period of 15 years. In every branch of education we must rationalize, in order to get the maximum result out of the means still available to us. Pluralistic education is a solution, but traditions in politics have existed for so long and have become so established here, that I would rather think in terms of forms of cooperation, than in forms of fusion, for example.

GREEK RETURN TO NATO MEANS CYPRUS STATUS QUO ACCEPTANCE

NC260942 Nicosia KIARAVGI in Greek 26 Aug 80 p 3

[Article from the "Views and Comments" column: "A Blow Against Cyprus"]

[Text] The return of Greece to NATO's military flank is considered certain and, moreover, imminent. Reliable sources confirm that an agreement has already been reached and that senior Washington and Atlantic alliance officials have engaged in behind-the-scenes activities to achieve this agreement. Moreover, in recent statements Greek Foreign Minister Mitsotakis has made it clear that Greece is determined to return to NATO, despite the fact that the reason for its withdrawal from NATO still stands: After the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the Greek Government declared its withdrawal from NATO's military flank and categorically stressed that it took this action in protest over the invasion and NATO's stand on the aggression. Moreover, the Greek Government stressed that it would return to NATO only if the reasons for its withdrawal were lifted, namely when the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus were restored.

Six years have elapsed since the Greek decision, and the situation remains unchanged. Turkey, a NATO member, blatantly violates Cyprus' lawful rights, while the North Atlantic Alliance encourages Turkey's efforts to impose solutions contrary to the Cypriot people's interests. However, Greece is getting ready to reintegrate into the alliance that brought so many calamities to Cyprus. In doing so, Greece is breaking its promises and inflicting a heavy blow against our cause. Greece's return to NATO before the Cyprus issue is solved would only mean the recognition or acceptance of the invasion's faits accomplis. How will the Greek Government implement its repeated statements in granting every possible assistance to Cyprus when, upon its reentry into NATO, it will be incarcerated in the armies of the enemies of Cyprus? We are very sorry this is being done, because Greece's only substantive protest action and pressure against the Turkish invasion is being nullified. We draw attention to the tremendous dangers this will have on our people and our cause.

CSO: 4908

GOVERNMENT MUST DEMAND TOTAL DEMILITARIZATION

NC240940 Nicosia KHARAVCI in Greek 24 Aug 80 p 1

[Editorial: "Total Demilitarization"]

[Text] The use of the British "sovereign" base at Akrotiri by the Americans for military purposes that are connected with their aggressive plans against Iran and other Middle East countries creates serious dangers for Cyprus. Every reasonable man and every consistent patriot must see the terrible consequences that would result not only for the security but also for our people's just struggle because of the conversion of Cyprus into a British-U.S. or Natoite springboard.

Yet, each time the government naively receives British assurances that the bases are not used either by the Americans or NATO. Moreover, although the last UN General Assembly resolution (paragraph 10) "hails the proposal for the total demilitarization of Cyprus" (not only of the "Republic of Cyprus" as it is mentioned elsewhere in connection with the withdrawal of foreign troops), the Cyprus Government does not appear to be inclined to seriously and resolutely raise the question of the use of the British bases and of their presence in Cyprus.

This is so because illusions are still being harbored that the "Western allies," NATO or the EEC might possibly assist in a Cyprus solution. The extreme right wing continues to promote such illusions so that we may remain tied to the chariot of the slaughterers of Cyprus, the organizers of the coup and of the invasion. But how is it possible for responsible statesmen to be so naive and to expect our salvation from those who are responsible for Cyprus' tragedy? How is it possible for them to overlook the fact that the main motive of the imperialists for the destruction or the partitioning of the Republic of Cyprus was and continues to be the securing of aggressive bases for NATO in Cyprus? How can they believe that Cyprus can safeguard its independence and sovereignty while foreign imperialist bases will be maintained on its territory?

The nonaligned countries that submitted the resolution that was approved by last year's UN General Assembly, see not only the need for the "total

demilitarization of Cyprus" for the sake of safeguarding the independence and security of the Cyprus Republic but they also raise this demand for the sake of peace and security for all the people in the area of the Eastern Mediterranean. We cannot continuously and unilaterally seek the support and solidarity of these countries if we do not actively promote the demand for the strengthening of the independence and security of the people living in this region and for the strengthening of international peace. The interests of all the nonaligned people in this region demand the abolition of the British bases in order to avert the danger of converting Cyprus into a U.S. or NATO bridgehead for intervention in the Middle East countries.

Thus, the government, instead of fearing that it might offend imperialist Britain if it promotes the imperative and just demand "for total demilitarization of Cyprus," should better see to the development of our ties with those countries that have been consistently supporting our cause--that is with the nonaligned and the socialist states. But in order to succeed in this it is necessary that we should be consistent with our political line. And in order to be consistent we must cease to harbor illusions about the imperialists. And above all we must understand the deadly danger from the foreign bases on Cyprus' territory, both to the independence and security of the people of Cyprus and to the neighboring friendly countries.

CSO: 4908

ATAKOL RETURNS FROM JAPAN VISIT

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 3 Jul 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] Kenan Atakol, foreign affairs, defense and tourism minister, says that his visit to Japan was very positive and productive. Atakol, who together with Taskent Atasayan, minister of industry and cooperatives, had just completed a 1-week visit in Japan as guest of the Japanese Islamic Congress, returned to Cyprus the night before last.

Relations with Japan

Atakol, who reported yesterday morning to the Council of Ministers on the subject of his visit, stated to a BRT [Bayrak Radio and Television] correspondent that he had found the opportunity during his stay in Japan to make ample contacts. During the course of discussions with Japanese businessmen, investors, tourist officials and politicians, Atakol noted that he had briefed them on Cypriot realities, the tourism potential of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus [TFSC] and the free port area and had explained to them what they would be able to do here.

Honorary Representative

Atakol, who stated that he had met with great understanding during the course of these contacts, said that he had conferred upon the chairman of the Islamic Congress, Dr Futaki, the title of honorary TFSC representative and that Dr Futaki would henceforth be representing the TFSC in matters concerning its commercial, social and touristic affairs in Japan.

Delegation Is Coming

Announcing that a delegation headed by Dr Futaki was expected to visit the TFSC this month, Atakol said: "We have hopes that following this visit it will be possible to develop relations between the TFSC and Japan in the fields of commerce, tourism and investment under the leadership of our Moslem brothers in Japan."

Disclosure Concerning Relations

Meanwhile a news release was issued by the TFSC Information Bureau with regard to the contacts made in Japan by Kenan Atakol and Taskent Atasayan, to the following effect:

"On the occasion of the opening of the Islamic Center in Tokyo, two ministers who visited Japan as guests of the Islamic Congress engaged in various contacts and explained the TFSC's commercial and tourism potential to Japanese businessmen and trade officials. The two ministers were accompanied in the delegation which visited Tokyo between 21 and 28 June by Husrev Cagin, the TFSC Information Bureau director and the secretary general of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, Tamer Ataner.

"Leaving Tokyo on 28 June the delegation went to London.

"In the course of the contacts the TFSC delegation had in Japan, issues relating to the establishment by Japan Airlines of a charter service at Ercan Airport, maritime freight transportation and the use of the 'free port' at the Gazi Magosa harbor were taken up.

"Following these discussions, agreement was reached regarding a visit to the TFSC of a Japanese commercial and tourism delegation in the next few weeks in order to make on-the-spot investigations."

9353
CSO: 4907

SHORTCOMINGS IN MANAGEMENT OF TFSC WATER SHORTAGES HIT

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 9 Jul 80 pp 1, 4

[Text] The department of Water Works, because of the arid summer season, has instituted a rational program for the distribution of water and has disclosed to the public the schedule by which each region will receive water, on which days and how many hours at a time. Be that as it may, this program has not been adhered to as announced for a long time. Water has been turned on in different areas at indefinite hours and for very short periods of time. Besides this, very often the pressure is so weak that it does not even reach the reservoirs on the top floors of buildings. Consequently complaints have begun to build up from a widely dispersed area regarding the water shortage. People are asking, "Since the distribution was not going to be done according to a clear and disciplined program why were we presented with a concocted program? Was this necessary?"

Borrowed Drinking Water

At the same time water is being brought into quite a few parts of Lefkosa, which is suffering greatly from the water shortage, and our citizens are trying to fill their reservoirs with water they buy from these tank trucks. Some families are complaining, "Put aside the business of washing and cleaning, we are having trouble finding even enough water to drink. Neighbors are frequently obliged to borrow water by the bottle from each other." In recent days it has become a very familiar sight to see water being carried from one quarter to another by the container in various conveyances or on foot.

Why This Silence?

The authorities appear to be letting the justified complaints of the populace regarding the water shortage and the disorganized distribution program go unanswered. Whereas in previous years sensitivity was shown toward this type of difficulty and complaints, and informative explanations and notifications were offered the public who were, therefore, aware that within the realm of possibility measures were being taken...

At the present time, people are wondering why this sensitivity has evaporated and why the authorities have elected to be silent and apparently indifferent to their complaints.

And Waste

Moreover, instances of waste and appearances contradictory to the water shortage have been witnessed. A foreigner seeing such waste would certainly think that we were living in a period of excess water. For example, no one has emerged to take care of a broken water main on Girne Ave which has been leaking for days. Does not this phenomenon on one of the busiest streets, not just in Lefkosa but in all of Cyprus, constitute a painful contradiction for the thousands of persons who are suffering from the water shortage? We call this situation to the attention of the responsible parties.

9353
CSO: 4907

POLICE TO PROTECT EDF NUCLEAR POWERPLANTS

Paris LE MONDE in French 2 Aug 80 p 6

[Text] The national police will be in charge of the external protection of EDF nuclear powerplants without, for that matter, having to create special units regarding this assignment. It is progressively that will be put into place this system of defense attached to the "critical points" that such installations represent, since the envisaged device (the disposition of security guards in various points) will be deployed starting this year and achieved around 1990.

According to official sources, the agreement between EDF's management and the police foresees the reinforcement of police companies and brigades which have, or will have, a nuclear powerplant within the geographic boundaries of their territorial jurisdictions for general surveillance.

There is in principle a police company at the seat of each arrondissement and a brigade per canton. But only the companies in charge of nuclear powerplant will be reinforced with approximately 20 policemen.

The policemen who will reinforce the company will not be at the disposition of EDF to form a specialized corps under the authority of its administration. According to the national police high command, these noncommission officers will continue to participate in regular and traditional functions of general law enforcement which are their field (judiciary police, administrative police and military police) and they will also be responsible for the protection and the mounting of stationary guard outside EDF nuclear powerplants. There will not be, then, as feared some policemen, an EDF special police--like the naval police, the police of the air, the air transport police, police of lethal weapons, which already exist--but a permanent mission for nuclear protection.

Radiological Intervention Units

Already, however, some active-duty policemen are worried about the decision to reinforce the territorial units near EDF nuclear powerplants.

They feel, in general, that brigades will be overburdened with new duties, and that this measure creates a disputable precedent, should other public services choose to imitate EDF.

The forces of law and order have been, as consultants, involved in the elaboration of plans for the prevention against malevolent acts and eventual sabotage against civilian nuclear installations.

Such intervention implies measures for external physical protection (enclosure and guard, conditions of access, etc.) and more punctual measures intended to thwart the efficiency of possible sabotage. But this protection is not limited to powerplant installations only, it concerns also nuclear materials or measures to be taken in case of accident. It is thus that legislative and regulatory authority complete with penalties in case of infraction is now established. Essentially, it extends to the civilian domain the dispositions of government control already in effect concerning defense, by creating a system of regulations, auditing and physical protection of transported nuclear materials.

On the other hand, Mr Christian Bonnet, minister of the Interior, decided to create 16 mobile radiological intervention units which will act as reinforcement for the fire department in case of accidents or incidents occurring in a nuclear powerplant, or during the transport of radioactive material.

According to the Department of the Interior news bulletin published Thursday, 31 July, in Paris, these mobile intervention units will be organized at the echelon of each defense zone--there are some in France--as well as within the instruction units of Civil Defense, the battalion of navy fire fighters of Marseille and the Paris fire brigade. The training of the staff will be accomplished during 3-week sessions by the National Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology, in cooperation with the Atomic Energy Commission.

9670

CSO: 3100

GREEK RETURN TO NATO WOULD 'HEARTEN' YUGOSLAVIA

AT241344 Athens TO VIMA in Greek 24 Aug 80 pp 1, 6

[Article by correspondent St. Evstathiadis]

[Text] Brussels, 23 August--NATO is most vitally interested in Greece's return to the alliance's military wing, not only to restore the so-called dynamics of its southeastern wing but also in order to "hearten" the new Yugoslav leaders who "will feel much more comfortable both in their internal and external policies when they have ascertained the restoration of balance in the eastern Mediterranean, especially if their southern boundaries are guaranteed with the same degree of quality that they had during the critical period in relations between Yugoslavia and Russia.

This statement was made by a senior NATO political officer in Brussels during an interesting and very informative talk with TO VIMA on the entire issue of the Greek return and its relevant problems. The NATO official, who for obvious reasons did not want his name identified with this explanatory statement, as he described it, let it be known that both President Carter and other Western leaders, including British Prime Minister Thatcher, have repeatedly assured Tito's successors that NATO "will restore" its southeastern wing and, in fact, very soon. The alliance official gave the impression, at least to one of his interlocutors, that Washington views Greece's return to NATO more as a political move aimed toward Yugoslavia rather than as an action aimed at Greece's security or the alliance's unity. Perhaps, however, this impression is not entirely correct.

According to the NATO official, the recent "generalization and intensify" of demonstrations of optimism concerning Greece's return, and related reports which are principally channeled from Washington, "are perhaps directed less toward Greek and U.S. public opinion and more toward the Yugoslav leadership as a sort of assurance that the obstacles which continue to block the return will in any case be surpassed, Greece's impending return will be implemented, and the NATO southeastern wing will be restored."

However, regardless of who is more interested and what the direct aim is, the fact remains that the issue of Greece's return to NATO is not advancing, at least it has not made such progress as to justify Washington's optimism--which very few people share at NATO headquarters in Brussels--and the expectation that the return is a matter of a few weeks.

Brussels does not hesitate to note Ankara's "strange" position on the entire issue--something that U.S. officials in Washington avoid--and characteristically notes that Ankara has essentially adhered to all the reservations it has expressed since the summer of 1978, even on issues of lesser significance than that of operational control of the Aegean--an issue on which its position remains firm.

Motives and calculations that are closely linked with the political situation in Turkey influence and to some extent define the Turkish position on the issue of return. Informed NATO circles characteristically mention that Ankara recently reneged on a point concerning the entire issue on which only a few days before it had shown commendable flexibility, specifically, on the technical issue of boundaries of electronic control in the Aegean.

At this moment, responsible NATO circles in Brussels give this description of where the issue of Greek return stands: "The situation is accessible and may change at any moment either toward a substantive promotion of the entire issue or toward a new deadlock." In any case, Brussels is not at all optimistic that the return will come in a matter of a few weeks; in fact, certain NATO officials, who specifically noted the uncertainty that has been created by Turkey's stance, did not hesitate to attribute Washington's euphoria regarding prospects for a quick settlement of the issue of return to an effort by President Carter to influence next November's election results.

It emerges from discussions with NATO political officials in Brussels that even now the so-called "differences" on the issue of return have not essentially been eliminated. "There always exists a significant distance in the views of Athens and Ankara regarding the issue of Aegean operational control, the role and responsibilities of Greek radar and means of electronic surveillance in the Aegean and so forth." According to the expression of a European NATO official, the Greek side too has manifested "new intransigence" on a number of relevant issues.

NATO expects something more than a "yes" or "no" from Athens and Ankara to the suggestions and proposals of General Rogers regarding Greece's return but, so far, the two interested governments do not seem to have come closer to each other's viewpoints, according to statements by very responsible officials of NATO headquarters. NATO headquarters in Brussels is responsible for the relevant negotiations together with Washington, which has undertaken the role of enhancing the efforts of all interested parties in order to implement the return. They are both continuing their

efforts with the understanding that time generally is working against NATO, against Western interests in Europe, something that currently both Athens and Ankara recognize.

A rather recent effort--which essentially was a repetition of a previous proposal to have Greece return to NATO and then hold general discussions on all the issues which have arisen between Athens and Ankara--does not seem to be advancing although the Turkish Government had accepted the pertinent proposal as "notable" only 3 weeks ago.

A rather strange but not so unusual Washington proposal to bridge the differences, mainly the issue of operational control, does not seem to have much more hope of success. Claiming that differences of substance are not involved but "differences with sentimental, political and ancient nationalistic motives," Washington has proposed that certain controversial expressions like operational control and so forth be changed into other expressions that so far are unknown to most people but essentially bring back a new terminology--rechristened is the characteristic expression--contained in the original Haig-Davos plan.

CSO: 4908

'TAKHYDROMOS' POLL SHOWS PASOK AHEAD OF NEW DEMOCRACY

AT231546 Athens TAKHYDROMOS in Greek 21 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] A public opinion poll that was made some time ago by ICAP Hellas Ae. Company shows Pasok to be the first party of preference of the Greek people.

Today we publish the results of two polls--one conducted in March this year and the other in May 1977--which asked the question: "If elections were held today, which party would you vote for?"

	1980	1977
1. Pasok	27 percent	10 percent
2. New Democracy	25	31
3. KKE	5	3
4. EDIK [Deomocratic Center Union]	2	7
5. Kodiso [Democratic Socialist Party]	1	--
6. National Party	2	--
7. Progressive Party	1	--
8. EDA [United Democratic Left]	1	--
9. Various others	2	2
10. KKE (Interior)	1	1
11. Blank ballot	1	5
12. Undecided	13	12
13. No reply	19	28
	100 percent	100 percent

As can be seen from this table: Pasok has raised its forces very significantly and for the first time is in first place for voter preference; New Democracy has suffered another decrease in its forces and for the first time has fallen to second place as compared to its monocratic sovereignty in the political firmament; the KKE has conquered third place, displacing the fragmented forces of the Center and maintaining its superiority on the left with an increased percentage.

Both the 1977 and 1980 polls were held in the 10 largest Greek cities (Athens, Thessaloniki, Patrai, Volos, Larisa, Iraklion, Kavala, Ioannina, Lamia, Tripolis) in which almost half of all Greeks live.

The age of the 1700 persons to whom our question was submitted by 34 researchers (five inspectors checked their work) was over 20, that is, the age when they vote--half were men, half were women.

In both cases those persons were chosen so that they constituted a representative sample of the population in the 10 cities.

In any case, as we have reported before, political polls in Greece do not easily give clear and final figures because a very large percentage of people do not reply to our questions (32 percent refused or reserved their answers in 1980 and 40 percent in 1977). In addition, the polls do not cover all of Greece but only its urban centers. However, these polls show most clearly the prevailing tendencies among voters.

Thus we can say that in March, that is, before Karamanlis became president and Rallis prime minister, the following situation existed:

1. With a great leap forward Pasok found itself in first place. At this point we would like to recall that our 1977 poll was the first to have noted the fact that Pasok had climbed to second place and that EDIK had dropped to third.

At the time, many people tried to dispute the fact but the elections which were held later absolutely confirmed it.

2. For the first time New Democracy lost first place. At this point we would like to recall that our 1977 poll revealed that for the first time New Democracy had lost a very significant number of voters, a fact that later elections completely confirmed.

3. The KKE held third place and was the strongest party of the extreme left. At this point we would like to recall that our 1977 poll was the first to note that the KKE was winning the struggle in that area. Many people tried at the time to dispute this fact but again the elections justified the results of the poll.

This was the situation before the last governmental changes. Of course, until next year's elections many of the tendencies shown in this year's poll may change but, equally so, they may become stronger.

CSO: 4908

FNV MEMBERS SPLIT ON GROENEVELT'S STRATEGY**Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 2 Aug 80 pp 8-10****[Article by Onno Reitsma]**

[Text] A Groenevelt that wants to talk... A Groenevelt that throws away the ax of the conflict model as a useless piece of equipment and embraces the harmony model... The employers reacted with optimism tempered with skepticism. And the Amsterdam stock exchange closed a few points higher. But within Arie Groenevelt's own FNV [Netherlands Trade Unions Federation] the reactions varied from "surprised" to "flabbergasted." Cees Schelling, chairman of the FNV Food Union, said, "How do you sell such a turn-around to the people you got out for mass demonstrations on the Dam and the Coolsingel in March against encroachments on the buying power? I cannot follow that policy."

The grab bag is empty. There are no nice things left in it. The tale of "soup first, presents afterwards" is told. If we want anything "afterwards" we shall have to pay for it. That idea has finally sunk in on the trade union movement. And definitely not since last week, when Arie Groenevelt's FNV Industrial Union presented its policy for the intermediate term. And under the significant title "Look Beyond," too. If anyone chooses to add "Your Nose," he does so on his own account, but it is in accord with the spirit of the 27-page document.

After years of polarization aimed at social reform (see the earlier programs "Fine is Different" and "Knit With a Red Thread"), the Industrial Union discovers now that the whole thing has run aground socioeconomically. No new discovery. It is only with regard to the causes that opinions differ somewhat. Where the employers say that we have priced ourselves out of the market with our high wages, "Look Beyond" says, "We believe that economic growth and employment have not run aground on high labor costs. We believe the high costs are a direct consequence of the fact that

economic growth has run aground." A nice explanation, but it is like telling the officer that you were going too fast because you were going down-hill with the wind at your back when your gas pedal got stuck. You won't get out of a ticket that way.

It is a new thing to be willing to discuss buying power. Up to now, to the FNV buying power has been a cow that could compete for sacredness with her Indian congener. To underscore her inviolability many thousands of FNV'ers came out in March of this year to demonstrate in Amsterdam and Rotterdam. But the wreath hung on her horns in mass demonstrations then is now being laid on the bargaining table by Groenevelt et al. As a medium of exchange. The Industrial Union is ready to accept a "temporary" lowering of the buying power in exchange for a shared place at the helm of our society. Participation in decisions concerning investments, jobs, and the quality of the work. By which Groenevelt implicitly acknowledges that the trade union movement has run aground on its old course. That nothing more can be gotten from the employers without something in return. He regretfully eyes the birds that have flown the coop: "We need not count on the multinationals and the enterprises that have taken refuge in a 'tax paradise.'"

And who is going to foot the bill? "We are. The unemployed and the incapacitated have already made their contribution. There is no reason at all why the well-trained generations that are now joining the labor force and have no chance of a safe and adequate job unless all hands are called on deck should not contribute. It is their future, after all. No government, political party, or union has the right to take the popular line in regard to this. Collective efforts can be made only by putting individual efforts together. The 'community' is not a panacea by which individual contributions can be escaped." Plain speech. Wim Kok, chairman of the federation, nodded with approval as he road over Groenevelt's shoulder.

Was all this really so new? In recent months a good deal of preparatory work has been done in the trade union papers. Union economists (among them Piet Vos of the Industrial Union) argued that the and-and-and line would not do any longer, that a choice had to be made between maintaining the buying power and maintaining the social benefits. "Academic babbling," the FNV rank and file thought almost unanimously. And what can one expect when their own predecessors for years--sometimes even when they knew better--contended that it is possible to have everything? For that reason "Look Beyond" shows bravery. Prompted by pragmatism. Arie Groenevelt has not thrown his ideals of a better society in the wastebasket. He has ...put them on ice "temporarily." Because it is going wrong. "Clearing the way for 200,000 in a few years' time is no trifle. If we do nothing, the bill will be presented to us irrevocably," he sighed to NRC/HANDELS-BLAD.

His members will not give "Look Beyond" a standing ovation, but his fellow chairmen of FNV unions are not raising the flag, either. And the procedural side--the content of the memorandum was unknown to his colleagues--

weighs less heavily in this than the content. Cees Schelling is expressing himself with polite mildness when he says that this memorandum was "entirely different" from the earlier policy papers. "Give an inch in the matter of purchasing power and the plant committee is exchanged for the management council; you won't see a leftist majority cabinet in power any more, but you will have the free-enterprise production instead--well, the Industrial Union has made a change of course that I had not expected. Nor do I know what caused the sudden change. For in the analysis of the economic situation we take the same line. But not with regard to the conclusions. When Van Veen (employers' chairman; edit.) says that we must be in a position to compete with a number of countries, in practice that means that your buying power must drop something like 25 percent. For then you might get back into competition with low-wage countries like Korea and Japan. But in the battle of competition with a country like Germany, why, we are pretty well in step; a few percentage points make no difference.

"What I find odd about the Industrial Union's paper is that it first states that employment and buying power have nothing to do with each other and then makes a plea for tripartite consultation (government, employers, and employees) and couples with that a readiness to moderate our demands. That is something like making a diagnosis that the patient is suffering from a stomach ulcer and then proposing to amputate a leg and see whether that helps... And the Industrial Union accepts incomes as a closing entry in the tripartite consultation. Why? Because, they say, we are afraid a wage regulation will come if we do nothing. But that is not our job, is it? It is our job to negotiate with the employers. And then it is the responsibility of the government to come up with a wage regulation or not. But do we need to put words in the government's mouth?"

Schelling's most fundamental objection to the Industrial Union's new approach is the belief in the profit-work relationship that is built into it. He no longer believes in it. "There is no way in the world to get a guarantee from the employers that profit will be converted into employment. If profit is made, it is invested in depth, in labor-saving machinery. That is the way of life. A few months ago I said, 'I hope not a single concern makes any more investments.' For investments lead to loss of employment.

"I see that in our industry, foods: profit is made by installing machines. That means that profit is no longer in line with work. It also means that these automation profits must gradually be earmarked for another purpose--the in-assets. And that is our contribution to the discussion of the present problem: a jobless income. Not a gospel, any more than the Industrial Union's memorandum is, but a beginning of a discussion of another approach. Because the notion of full employment is outdated, and we must accept a structural unemployment. From sheer necessity."

When it is thrown up to Cees Schelling that he is steering toward a new elite, the elite of the workers, he finds it hard to go along with the

idea. But of course it is true. It is industry that functions as the locomotive of our welfare. All the cars coupled to it (officialdom, welfare workers, recipients of benefits, etc.) get their speed from that of the locomotive. The present cabinet has replaced the iron couplings with rubber ones. There is more stretch in them. But the threat of a total uncoupling hangs over the market. Arie Groeneveld is now ready--on certain conditions--to take a little steam away from the locomotive. That way the rubber between the locomotive and the cars will not have to snap. Cees Schelling, on the other hand, does not want to give in, does not believe that sort of thing will help, and is throwing a few more shovelfuls of coal on the fire. The locomotive goes roaring away and the cars fade away in the distance.

Schelling says, "It is not my picture, but it is not entirely wrong. For actually there is already a working élite, socially and culturally. And I can only see that split growing wider. Five years from now I foresee three categories:

- "1) Those who cannot or will not join the fray,
- "2) The working élite, whom nobody can touch because it is they that keep the machines running; what they earn makes no difference, if only they keep the machines going; and
- "3) Lastly, the CAO (Collective Labor Agreement) workers as the remaining group, which can be pushed around at will.

"That is the way I see the development of society. And to take away the resultant sociocultural stratification, we propose an unemployment income. Then everyone can decide for himself whether he wants to work or not. With a bit of compulsory service to society, since there are always unpleasant jobs to be done in society. Once more, it is no gospel. It is a contribution to the discussion. But we'll never make it on the full employment tack."

8815

CSO: 3105

PVDA'S PELLE MUG: CONTROVERSIAL FIGURE IN AMSTERDAM CITY COUNCIL**Amsterdam ELSEVIERS MAGAZINE in Dutch 2 Aug 80 pp 15-17****[Article by René de Bok]**

[Text] In the Amsterdam council of mayor and aldermen early retirement appears to be rather the rule than the exception. The PvdA [Labor Party] leads out in this *dansse macabre*. Established reputations have disappeared from the stage: Han Lammers, Irene Vorrink, Wim Sinnige. The vacancy left by the departure of Sinnige as alderman in charge of finances has now been filled. Pelle Mug, group leader of the Amsterdam PvdA, is going to take over the capital's cash-book. But his choice seems the prelude to a new government crisis. ELSEVIER profile of Pelle Mug: the messenger boy that feels misunderstood.

The other day Koornstra, the Amsterdam PvdA municipal council member, left little doubt about his estimate of Pelle Mug as the new alderman in charge of finances. "The fact that you can add and subtract still does not mean that you are a good manager." That marginal note from his own circle was a cooled-down symptom of the violent discussion in the Amsterdam PvdA over the intrinsic value of Pelle Mug's aldermanship. The last meeting of the party group before the recess degenerated into a fraternal squabble. At a certain point Alderman Jan Schaefer faced the group with the choice: Mug goes or I go. And Mayor Polak had to come in in the wee small hours just to keep the enmities within acceptable bounds. But in spite of the threat of the heavy guns brought up by Jan Schaefer, who threw in all he had--his power to convince, his flow of words, his tremendous embonpoint--the group stood firm in backing Pelle Mug's candidacy. Because there was no other candidate. And because the cards had already been shuffled. Mug was predestined for the position of messenger boy in the Amsterdam council.

The PvdA regional committee had worked out this plan of campaign after a conclave with the PvdA central committee. Through Pelle Mug and his

colleague Michael van der Vlis, the alderman in charge of zoning, traffic, and transportation, the party central committee expects to get a better grip on the shifting Amsterdam municipal politics. With the promotion of Pelle Mug it is also hoped to promote peace in the group. At a group meeting in the spring of this year confidence in Mug was withdrawn, but he stayed on because the members of the group could not reach agreement on a successor.

For years Pelle Mug has been a source of trouble within the PvdA. He is from a reliable SDAP [Social-Democratic Labor Party] environment; his father was a member of the Diamond Cutters' Union. Pelle Mug applied for membership in the PvdA at 18 years of age. He was past president of the Haarlem chapter of the AJC [Labor League of Youth]. For a while his position as a progressive member of society was evidenced only by his playing outside left on a youth soccer eleven of RCH [expansion unknown]. After attending the gymnasium in Overveen, Mug got his teaching certificate in geography and took it to the head of the department of social geography at the University of Amsterdam. For a while he associated with the New Left movement, but broke off because of the atmosphere within that club. Mug stood for frankness. A watchword that got him an extra dose of good will in the initial period of populism in the PvdA.

Pelle Mug rose to the chairmanship of the Amsterdam district. Since 1974 he has been a member of the Amsterdam municipal council. His effort to reduce the political leadership to a strict mandate from the rank and file runs like a red thread through his career. In one of his very first public speeches he said, "Cannons can no longer take a congress in tow if the congress does not want that." With the political message, "When the party has discussed the theme of peace and security for years and the congress decides: We are not buying the F 16, then a socialist minister must not procure the F 16."

Mug was a supporter of the elected mayor. He saw the function limited to the chairmanship of the council of mayor and aldermen. Policy, Mug insisted, must be made by the aldermen. The mandate philosophy restricts the freedom of movement of the political leadership. Mug foresaw that. And he found it proper that aldermen could be whistled back by the party if they did not hold to the party line. "In the PvdA view aldermen are first and foremost members of the PvdA group. That means that the aldermen must carry out the principles of the platform as far as possible. They are elected on that basis. To me the platform is not a dead letter."

Another aspect of Pelle Mug's political strategy is his pathological preference for the united front in politics. While Max van den Berg was getting the Groningen platform committee off the ground, the procedure-maniac Mug was working away at an Amsterdam majority strategy: "The leftist parties in the Netherlands are too much divided. I find that very bad, for we must not use up our energy fighting each other, but spend it attacking our real enemies: those who are really in the saddle, the employers and the like."

In August 1974 Mug launched his offensive against Alderman Han Lammers's establishment position. In MORGENROOD, the organ of the Federation of Youth Groups in the PvdA, Mug expressed sharp criticism of the rôle of his fellow party member Lammers, who was negotiating on behalf of the four progressive parties on forming a coalition in the council of mayor and aldermen. Lammers had stated that Den Uyl had made the promise that the CDA would be included in the council. "But," said Mug, "our district meeting has nothing to do with that promise... I have always said that Han Lammers is no spokesman for four parties. He defends his own political purposes exclusively."

The crisis within the Amsterdam PvdA sharpened until there were two camps, the Mug group and the Lammers group. The metro affair, in which Lammers's head was demanded, was only one incident in a series of unpleasantnesses. The leadership crisis of 1975 disturbed the internal relationships within the group so much that an unworkable climate for years to come was a real possibility.

A central feature was the failure of the program committee that was formed in 1974 with the PPR [Political Party of Radicals] and the PSP [Pacifist Socialist Party]. The majority of the PvdA group supported the initiative of the board of aldermen to throw their colleague Roel van Duijn out of the saddle. The same majority gave their fiat to the inclusion of the CDA [Christian Democratic Appeal] and VVD [People's Party for Freedom and Democracy] in the council to fill the vacancies that had been opened up by disintegration of the progressive council.

The last maneuver in particular suited the PvdA district only moderately well. The next election platform was aimed again at the formation of a progressive coalition. The council members who had taken a disloyal attitude toward that platform plank at the time were deprived of all support. This did not apply to the minority group, of which Pelle Mug came forward as leader and Astrid Blokpoel, Ernst Dienaar, and Wim Polak were true followers. That their position in the Amsterdam district was strengthened was clear from the final selection. The then group leader Paul Rutgers van der Loeff was put up as a candidate by only 5 of the 16 Amsterdam divisions, alderman Pit Treumann by 2, and De Cloe had wisely withdrawn. Rutgers van der Loeff drew the only sensible conclusion and withdrew.

That opened the way for Pelle Mug, the man of the united front, the man who regarded the party as the watchdog for politicians. Pelle Mug had resolved to restore peace and unity within the group. He stood guarantor for the scenario by which approximately half the group was liquidated at a single blow. But the transformation was not accompanied by internal peace. Mug had submitted to the leadership of the PvdA district of Amsterdam too often for that. The PvdA delegation that carried on the negotiations over the new council of mayor and alderman to be formed was under the tutelage of the district. Besides Mug and council member Van der Vlis, it included Roel Poppe, chairman, and Norbert Smulders, vice chairman, of the PvdA district of Amsterdam.

When the division within the PvdA appeared to be a more than temporary phenomenon, hope was pinned to the robust, workmanlike figure of former secretary of state Jan Schaefer. With his dominating personality, working class hero Schaefer would know how to deal with the malaise within the socialist stronghold. But even Schaefer's trip through the PvdA china-shop was not accomplished without breakage. And "Jan Schaefer is coming" was quickly replaced with "Jan Schaefer can go away again."

Mug tried in his way to keep his head above water. But in a recent debate over legal action to seize the squatter-occupied De Groote Keyser it was made clear how poorly a party group in a council operates when it has become a football of the rank and file. The pitiable Mug swung like a wind-vane first to one side and then to the other. At the beginning of the debate he had expressed himself in veiled terms in favor of seizure of De Groote Keyser, but gave up that standpoint immediately when the group protested. Then when the PvdA district of Amsterdam expressed itself for the seizure and thus took Mug's side, he cried out in despair that he would "catch thunder in the party group."

The council debate over the uprising of the squatters on the Vondelstraat was also illustrative of the division in the PvdA group. The debate gave no indication at all of what the PvdA really stood for. The policy of the socialist Mayor Polak was neither approved nor disapproved. The speech by Pelle Mug, the group chairman, was a ballet scene from the Scapino children's ballet: sympathy for the squatter movement, for the police, for the mayor--neither fish nor flesh.

The top echelon of the PvdA has by no means failed to notice the anti-politics of the PvdA group in the Amsterdam city council, either. After the departure of alderwoman Irene Vorrink in August 1979, Den Uyl seemed to have an eye for the destructive aspect: "What is wrong with the Amsterdam PvdA when Vorrink gets out within a year?" No answer was forthcoming. The choice of Pelle Mug as alderman in charge of finances calls attention to the PvdA's impotence at the administration level.

There is plenty of resentment of Mug as a person. He is called a schoolmaster, a procedure freak. He is not an inspiring man, but a man who hides behind political time-tables or scenarios, as he himself prefers to call his political strategies. Outside the actual political field his behavior is frequently censured. He manages by hook or crook to parry personal attacks on his rôle as speculator, as co-financer of a brothel. A recent collision with the squatters due to Mug's having allegedly mentioned the name of a squatter in the presence of a legal residence of the squatters' building on the Prins Hendrikkade is regarded in PvdA circles as extremely unfortunate.

The standard-bearer for the most recent city council elections, Jan Schaefer, now alderman in charge of housing and urban renewal, made yet another effort to cancel Mug's candidacy for alderman in charge of

finances. Schaefer had gone looking for a way to restore the contacts with the CPN [Communist Party of the Netherlands] that had been wrecked by Rudi van der Velde's departure as alderman. But halfway through his search Jan Schaefer, to his amazement, was called off by the PvdA district.

Schaefer is now thinking over the situation that has arisen. It does not look at all flourishing. Neither for Schaefer, who has known since August that he has the team of Mug and Van der Vlis against him, a team that gets its signals direct from the PvdA district of Amsterdam; nor for the Amsterdam city government, which has got a man in its midst that is there as a puppet of the rank and file of a party, not as an alert administrator that thinks for himself,--as is of essential importance for the exercise of one of the most important and difficult aldermanic functions.

The phenomenon Mug functions only as a serving hatch, for although he always knows how to put the political facts in a neat row, nobody can ever get a sound of his own out of him. Mug will perform his function as a messenger boy, no matter how misunderstood. For Amsterdam municipal politics the certificate of incapacity that Pelle Mug is writing with his own hand in the exercise of his aldermanship is nothing more than a weak excuse.

8815

CSO: 3105

POLITICAL, ELECTION INVOLVEMENT SOWS DISCORD WITHIN MILITARY**General Cardoso Explains Involvement**

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] The last meeting of the Council of the Revolution [CR] held on Wednesday proved, after all, not to be a "heated" one, as many observers went so far as to admit (and even the news media reported) following the speech given by Gen Pedro Cardoso, chief of the EME [Army General Staff], at the Military Academy on Army Day, 25 July, and the reactions that it evoked, at least among certain CR members. However, it was decided to continue the discussion at the next session of that organ of sovereignty.

In his address of 25 July, Gen Pedro Cardoso made some comments regarding unspecified members of the Council of the Revolution, which were nevertheless thought by some observers to have been aimed particularly at Maj Vasco Lourenco, who had given an emphatic interview on the situation in the Armed Forces, although they applied indirectly to other CR members.

Pedro Cardoso specifically stated: "The Army is not embarrassed, and has not been affected by the decline in political image that has been suffered by the Council of the Revolution," adding, "This decline is due to improper political activity on the part of some of its members."

He continued: "As commander of the Army, I must publicly emphasize the displeasure with which the action of certain members of the Army military is viewed; military who, taking advantage of special status, have benefited from the impunity and lack of responsibility that such status has lent them."

The Debate in the CR

The first official reaction from a CR member came from Franco Charais, the only general in the artillery and only general who is a CR member and is not affiliated with the military high command. He declared that he did not "recognize Pedro Cardoso's authority" for making such statements. Vasco Lourenco returned to the topic in an interview with PORTUGAL HOJE, wherein he strongly denounced aspects of the personality and past of Soares Carneiro, thus attacking his candidacy.

As a result of the "turmoil" which then began to arise among the military, according to certain newspapers associated with forces attempting to capitalize on it, Vitor Alves, in his usual remarks before CR meetings, was forced to throw a wet blanket on it, and play down the situation.

On Wednesday, the discussion of this matter by the Council of the Revolution did not take place until after dinner, for 5 of the 8 hours that the meeting lasted, and O JORNAL learned from sources close to the CR that it was decided to continue that discussion at the next session.

According to the same sources, several Council members brought up the subject, including Almeida e Costa who, in remarks which were considered harsh, made an appeal to the moral values and ethics of the Armed Forces, stressing the need for a change in the present situation among the Armed Forces, wherein "ethics and morals are being disdained."

Vasco Lourenco, Pezarat Correia, Franco Charais, Martins Guerreiro, Sousa e Castro and Marques Junior were other speakers, while Melo Antunes remained silent. None of the Council members were absent from the meeting.

The chief of the Army General Staff, Gen Pedro Cardoso, justified himself by stating that he speaks only once a year, and always says what he thinks, like the other Council members who speak all year long. According to O JORNAL's source, Pedro Cardoso reacted moderately to the opposing remarks, and argued that his speech could be interpreted in several ways.

The same source also noted that Ramalho Eanes did not express himself directly, merely saying that there were problems in the Armed Forces which are in urgent need of solutions.

In Gen Pedro Cardoso's speech, what caused bewilderment and disagreement among some of the military (who are not exactly close to the majority in the CR), and gratification among others (more to the right, and close to Soares Carneiro), was the fact that the CEME [Army Chief of Staff] criticized only certain members of that organ of sovereignty who, as such, are therefore not subordinate to him in the chain of command, and said nothing about the activity of the AD [Democratic Alliance] candidate, a military man on active duty who has participated in party demonstrations and rallies; something which impartial legal circles still regard as a violation of the regulations on military discipline.

Military Must Refrain From Imposing Conditions on the Voting

Meanwhile, the CR approved, by a consensus, a communique on "the military and the elections" which, contrary to what was published in the press, was not prompted by Pedro Cardoso's speech and the reactions that it evoked because its publication had been decided upon at a previous CR meeting.

According to O JORNAL's sources, the chiefs of staff of the three branches of the Armed Forces initially expressed opposition to the publication of the text, since they felt that such instructions should be conveyed to the military through the normal chain of command. Subsequently, however, they did not raise any objections to its publication.

Thus, the notion of publishing it overtly prevailed, and there were no major obstacles to the approval of the document proposed by Vitor Alves, although certain changes were made in it.

The text emphasizes that "it is incumbent on all members of the military in active service, whatever be their rank or position, to refrain from imposing conditions on any electoral option," and gives a reminder of the constitutional functions of the Armed Forces, specifically, their "strictly nonpartisan" nature.

Unconstitutional Rulings

Meanwhile, the discussion of promotions was postponed for another week, and two opinions of the Constitutional Commission were approved: one which did not pronounce judgment on the unconstitutionality of provisions in the Electoral Law for the Assembly of the Republic (an unconstitutionality which had been sought by the Regional Government of the Azores); and another one which considers as unconstitutional rulings in a legal document relating to the dismissal of workers from the respective business firms which occurred between 25 April 1974 and 25 April 1976, an unconstitutionality which had been called for by the attorney general of the republic.

The Old 'Telegram Method'

Nevertheless, a source close to the Armed Forces high command labeled the report circulated and exploited by right wing newspapers to the effect that messages had been received by the EME from military units, backing Gen Pedro Cardoso and the tone of the speech delivered by him on Army day, as being an "unreliable contrivance, because it was not up to date."

A regular meeting of unit commanders from the Lisbon Military Region, held at the RALIS [Artillery Regiment of Lisbon], also served to evoke speculation in the same press. When the Lisbon Military Region was contacted, it was explained to O JORNAL that this meeting is one held regularly every month, that it had been set a long time ago and that it had nothing to do with recent events.

The source which we have been quoting reminded us that "this manipulation calls to mind the contrivances that were arranged in 1975, for the purpose of destabilizing the military institution. But as it is being used now, it has assumed an irrelevant aspect."

The same source underscored the fact that: "There is no turmoil in the Armed Forces; the military institution accepts and is playing its role in the democratic state, refusing to resort to the telegram method, or to any improper process of dialog among its members."

The same source added: "It would appear that there are still some who think that the military institution can be manipulated by crude processes of this kind; but those who do so are committing an unpardonable mistake, by forgetting that the Armed Forces understand, accept and respect the role of the military institution in a democracy, and that they have gained sufficient experience not to let themselves be manipulated by political tricks such as those which have had repercussions in the news media."

Commentary on Cardoso Explanation

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Aug 80 p 3

[Article by Manuel F. Andrade: "Pedro Cardoso's Speech, the Council of the Revolution, the AD and the Left"]

[Text] At the ceremony marking Army Day, when the Army Chief of Staff explained the institutional position of the branch of service which he commands with respect to the organ of sovereignty which is the Council of the Revolution, and the action of some of its members, he depicted, without any major deviations, the real status of the Armed Forces from a politico-military standpoint.

It was not a retort (which was perhaps desired) to recent, differing interviews with and statements by members of the CR, both with regard to the military institution and the military commanders.

It was, indeed, a skillful utilization of these political incidents (improper acts), on an occasion aptly selected for doing so, to lend credibility, in a moderate, institutionally correct address, to two essential elements (objectives) in the Politico-Electoral Manifesto of the AD generals:

A demonstration that the institutional and politico-ideological control of the Armed Forces has left the hands of the present Chief of Staff (a potential adversary of the AD candidate);

The creation of subjective and objective conditions favoring the reformation of the CR in the event that its candidate is victorious.

It is unthinkable that this act on the part of the Army Chief of Staff was an unplanned one. Overrating the conviction of certain natural leaders (or those who feel that they are such) and their actual influence in the Armed Forces, and making possible and provoking the political action (acts) which those leaders immediately undertook and will probably continue to undertake, Pedro Cardoso engaged in a right of center speech addressed

intrinsically to the military, providing stronger protection and more leeway for the group of colonels in the Army which backs and is promoting the "AD" general's candidacy.

Now (and in addition), this act has assumed the following dimensions: Through the impression made that the military left (via CR members) in undertaking action that implicitly stems from the electoral strategy of the FRS [Social-Left Republican Front] (and/or the left as a whole), it minimizes the dramatic effects that the overly partisanized image which the "AD" general, Soares Carneiro, would have conveyed to the Armed Forces' political center, and restores his disrepute, which is by now obvious to the majority of cadres.

Incapable at all times of distinguishing the essential from the secondary; incapable, in obvious situations, of certain views dissociated from personal advancement; incapable of assuming certain political consequences resulting from objective facts and political conditions beyond its control; incapable of acts of humility in appraising the capacity for response or intervention when faced with changes in circumstances; in short, incapable of theorizing in the realm of tactical action to the minimal extent required of it, that is, in the consistent defense of the democratic regime, a certain military left has disclosed a distressing lack of political perspective, and has systematically allowed the military right to reverse certain subjective and psychological conditions, putting them to its advantage, albeit temporarily.

The military left (or what is so called) persists in remaining (contradictorily) unchangeable in its self-justification, which is generally confused with self-sufficiency, and in its ostentatious self-sacrifice.

For each new failure, resulting directly from the tactical inappropriateness of its action and lack of any coherent plan (which is paralleled only among a certain "civilian" left), the superficial justification reflects (with a rather naive quality) a yearning for power that is hardly in keeping with the ethical sense of democracy which the left must necessarily preserve and cultivate.

Note: For several months, during 1975 and 1976 in particular, Manuel F. Andrade was one of O JORNAL's most widely discussed and prestigious (and of course, at times controversial) collaborators. An expert on military affairs, fully involved in the defense of 25 April and of the democratic regime, with a thorough understanding of the realities and the status of the Armed Forces, but without dissociating them from the national context of which they are a part, Manuel F. Andrade quickly gained an unequaled position in the Portuguese press, wherein he was the first to deal with these subjects with an insight and an equanimity that other similar columns which, in most instances, appeared for the purpose of attaining certain political or group objectives, and to foster lies or intrigue, never possessed.

However, upon the institutionalization and consolidation of the democratic regime, and the resultant calmness in the military sector, he felt that continuing the collaboration on these topics was unwarranted. Nevertheless, recent events, particularly those which took place after the announcement of Gen Soares Carneiro's candidacy representing AD, have again brought about an exacerbation of those problems which fully justifies the reappearance of Manuel F. Andrade.

2909

CSO: 3101

UGT'S PACHECO NOT TO SUPPORT SOARES CARNEIRO'S CANDIDACY

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 11-17 Jul 80 p 18

[Text] The president of the general council of the UGT [General Union of Workers], Miguel Pacheco, did not attend the dinner given by a group of social democratic trade unionists to honor the AD [Democratic Alliance] candidate for the presidency of the republic. The number two man in the UGT hierarchy, a PSD [Social Democratic Party] deputy, was not present at the luncheon at which the social democratic parliamentary group met with Gen Soares Carneiro either.

This position adopted by Miguel Pacheco--who, contrary to what an evening paper reported, did not sign the trade unionists' letter addressed to Soares Carneiro--is due, O JORNAL learned, to two types of reasoning. On the one hand, he himself feels that it is better for the UGT not to become involved in the presidential debate. "The UGT," he told us in this connection, "should take a neutral position toward the presidential election."

On the other hand, he would prefer that his party reach an agreement with Ramalho Eanes, particularly since, in his view, he is "an honest and principled man with whom I am fully satisfied."

Questioned about his position with regard to the candidacy of Soares Carneiro, Miguel Pacheco told us his support is out of the question. "If it is plainly impossible to reconcile Eanes and my party, and awaiting its decision to support Gen Soares Carneiro, there was no other decision I could make," he explained. However, the president of the UGT does not conceal his lack of enthusiasm for the solution adopted by the PSD. Commenting on the letter sent by his trade union colleagues to the AD presidential candidate, Miguel Pacheco told us that "I did not sign it nor will I." "It is a document which means absolutely nothing to me," he went on to say, "as I have nothing for or against it."

UGT Leadership Support

It was at the Hotel D. Manuel that about a hundred PSD trade unionists met with Gen Soares Carneiro last Monday to present him with a letter in which

they set forth "public support" of his candidacy. The document, signed by all those present, called Soares Carneiro "a military officer who, on 25 April, because of identification with his principles and zeal in their implementation, respected the program which the Junta of National Salvation presented to the Portuguese people." "We are pleased with the clarity of the political program with which you have identified yourself," the signers said, adding that in their view Soares Carneiro represents "an increased hope of defense of the basic gains of the Portuguese workers."

Soares Carneiro, who was introduced individually to all those present by Antonio Cabecinha, a member of the political council for his candidacy, spoke twice, and also answered the questions of several persons. Those present included some of the best-known trade unionists in the PSD in Lisbon, with Miguel Pacheco, as has been said, being absent. Carlos Cardoso, Rui Oliveira e Costa and Jose Manuel Barradas, of the UGT, were present. Cardoso Martins and Fernando Figueiredo were not present, but their support is not in question. Also present were leaders of major UGT unions, including the SICESE, Bank Workers of the South and Islands, SINTAP, private school teachers, sales technicians, SETUBAL offices, and state economists and technical cadres, among others, as well as members of the workers' commissions. Also present at the dinner was Deputy Nascimento Rodrigues, president of the Parliamentary Labor Commission, as well as, for the final phase, Carlos Macedo.

A similar gathering was held on Wednesday in Oporto. It is acknowledged that some trade unionists who have already been sounded out by some national leaders of the UGT have promised adherence to the national commission to support Gen Soares Carneiro.

Tense Relations

The public support evidenced by the social democratic sector of the UGT for Soares Carneiro is expected to be one of the points discussed further today during a meeting of the national secretariat of that trade union organization. Although it is not on the agenda, the problem is expected to be raised by socialist leaders who, O JORNAL was able to learn, were totally surprised by the venture of their partners.

Moreover, relations between the PS [Socialist Party] and the PSD became particularly tense during the week because of various events. For example, without the knowledge of the socialists, social democratic trade unions in the UGT met in Oporto on Saturday with the prime minister to demand the resignation of Minister of Labor Eusebio Marques de Carvalho. This "requirement"--socialist sources maintain--had never been discussed within the UGT bodies, and moreover has not yet been accepted by Sa Carneiro.

On the other hand, the two sectors in the UGT clashed again during the congress of the Braga Office Workers' Trade Union held this weekend. Lacking any agreement, separate slates were presented--first for the delegates to the congress, and then during it, for the administrative bodies and the congress of the UGT. The PSD slate triumphed, although it was keenly disputed by the socialists.

CGTP LEADERS SPLIT ON SUPPORT FOR LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Aug 80 p 15

[Article by A. A.: "The CGTP and the Elections--Jose Judas and Manuel Lopes, APU Candidates"]

[Text] Jose Luis Judas and Manuel Lopes, for the APU [United People's Alliance], and Kalidas Barreto, for the FRS [Republican and Socialist Front], are the three members of the Executive Commission of the Secretariat of the CGTP [General Federation of Portuguese Workers] running in the next legislative elections for the Lisbon district. However, since Joaquim Calhau and Emilia Reis of the Secretariat of the CGTP refused the APU invitation to run on its slate, it is believed that that organization will include the name of Manuel Carvalho da Silva, also a member of the Executive Commission of the Secretariat of the CGTP, on the slate for Oporto. It should be added that Antonio Goncalves, of the CGTP Secretariat, is likely to appear on the UDP [Popular Democratic Union] slate for Lisbon.

The decision of the CGTP leaders to agree to the integration of the slates of the party forces was made after a consensus was established in the Secretariat to the effect that the advantages of individual candidacies were greater than the possible disadvantages, and that the fact that some would appear on the APU slate and others on that of the FRS should not raise problems or create any contradictions, but rather would reflect the reality in the CGTP, in which various political-trade union trends coexist.

The Secretariat of the CGTP is also persuaded that if the inclusion of its leaders on the slates of various political party groups had no other merit, it should at least contribute to destroying, once and for all, the charge, both internal and external, that the CGTP is a monolithic structure.

As is known, the first candidacy announced was that of Kalidas Barreto, as a member of the UEDS [Leftist Union for Socialist Democracy], on the FRS slate. The decision of this trade unionist was followed very recently by those of Jose Luis Judas and Manuel Lopes, the first as a PCP militant and the second as an independent. But while Kalidas, under the terms of the agreement with the UEDS, is to be included in the "grey" area (probable

election) on the Lisbon slate of the FRS, Judas and Lopes will be included on the APU slate for the capital in places (consecutive) where their election is practically guaranteed.

When asked by O JORNAL to comment on his decision to agree to run as a candidate for the APU, Jose Luis Judas said: "It is a decision by a citizen and militant in a political party, since I consider my inclusion on the slate as important. Thus it is a decision which has nothing to do with my status as a CGTP leader, and I believe that my inclusion on the APU slate is not in contradiction with the duty I have, in good conscience, to defend the interests of the workers," Jose Judas concluded.

Moreover, the APU has issued invitations to still other trade unionists unaffiliated with the member organizations (PCP and MDP/CDE [Portuguese Democratic Movement/Democratic Electoral Commission]). These include Joaquim Calhau and Maria Emilia Reis, both members of the FUT Base, the former being a member of the Executive Commission and the latter of the Secretariat of the CGTP. These trade unionists would run as independents, the former for Coimbra and the latter for Oporto, and they would be listed on the respective slates in the order of the likelihood of election. But after some reflection, both decided to refuse the invitation.

The APU, however, does not appear to have abandoned including a trade unionist on the Oporto slate, considering the possibility of nominating Manuel Carvalho da Silva, of the Executive Commission of the Secretariat of the CGTP, and a member of the PCP. Another possibility, according to the sources we have asked, who are close to the CGTP, would be Manuel Ranita, of the Secretariat of the Oporto Union Federation, who enjoys great prestige in that region.

In addition to this, the UDP too will include trade unionists on its slate. For example, the participation of Antonio Goncalves, of the Lisbon Meats Trade Union and a member of the Secretariat of the CGTP on the Lisbon slate of that organization, is apparently a certainty. This trade unionist is a member of the Communist Unity (UC), which recently decided to support the UDP.

Electoral Campaign

The direct involvement of some of the highest leaders of the CGTP in the elections implies that the organization will plunge into the electoral campaign, mobilizing more funds and forces than in the earlier intercalary elections, when for the first time it participated openly in the campaign.

But this time delicate problems may be posed because of the fact that the leaders of the federation are divided among the APU, FRS and UDP, and will therefore be "enemies" in the campaign. This was, moreover, one of the questions raised by the newsmen attending the press conference held

yesterday (Thursday) to set forth the official position of the CGTP with regard to the elections.

In answer to the question, Jose Luis Judas said that an ideological campaign will not be waged, but rather one based on specific facts and the prospects for the defense of the interests of the workers. And from this point of view there is no basis for fearing possible clashes among the trade unionists running in the elections.

"Conflict and contradiction there may be in the UGT [General Union of Workers]," that union leader went on to say, "since what is at issue in the coming elections is the safeguarding of the democratic and constitutional system, and this divides that organization in half."

As was clear from the words of that trade union leader, the CGTP participation in the electoral campaign will be subordinated to the theme "defense of the interests of the workers," which implies the mobilization of all the workers to vote for the leftist parties in order to defeat the AD [Democratic Alliance].

In fact, in the view of the CGTP, the AD government has caused a substantial deterioration in living conditions for the Portuguese workers and challenged the rights of the workers and some of the most important gains set forth in the constitution. And, obviously, if the AD wins, the CGTP thinks, everything will get worse.

Therefore the CGTP is ready, as was said at the press conference, to contribute to the creation of a democratic government which will seriously undertake a commitment to satisfy the main demands of the trade union movement, including the revocation of the term contracts law, a maximum period of 12 months for wage tables, price controls, a campaign against unemployment, defense of the public, cooperative and self-managing sector, respect for the National Health Service, respect for trade union rights and freedoms, reorganization of the labor courts and improvement of the housing and education policy.

To achieve these goals, as we have said before, the CGTP will participate in the electoral campaign, distributing posters (on the minimum wage, term contracts, reforms and cost of living) and using the trade union press to publicize and call attention to specific issues. Apart from this, the CGTP plans to spend a part of its television time in September on the electoral campaign, while at the same time making use of it in connection with the celebrations of its 10th anniversary on 1 October.

5157
CSO: 3101

FLA LEADER INTERVIEWED, INDEPENDENCE STILL GOAL

Ponta Delgada CORREIO DOS ACORES in Portuguese 3 Aug 80 p 3

[Interview with Jose de Almeida, leader of Azorean Liberation Front, by J. Tavares de Melo]

[Text] "Pieces of String." Dr Jose de Almeida, imagine -- we tell him maliciously and jokingly -- that we had a magic wand. What would you ask us for first of all?

[Answer] Independence of the Azores.

[Question] Forget that you are leader of the FLA [Azorean Liberation Front] and, as a citizen who is very familiar with the islands, tell us sincerely and realistically whether the Azores have (or will have) economic, industrial, human-intellectual structures suitable for them to be independent.

[Answer] The Seventh International Conference of American States, in Montevideo, specified how a state must be, in order to be regarded as independent. Thus, "a state, regarded as an individual in international law, must have the following qualifications:

- "A. A permanent population.
- "B. A definite territory.
- "C. A government.
- "D. Capability of having relations with other states."

With regard to points A and B, I believe that there would be no problems.

Point C: who can deny that the MNA [expansion unknown, probably Azorean Nationalist Movement] / FLA does not have a "shadow government" ready to go in operation?

Point D: International centers have been created in support of the Movement and access corridors have been opened to the governments of Western countries. Therefore, we feel quite at ease with regard to this matter.

Economic Problems: We are dependent on a superdependent country whose labor structures have placed Portugal in an economically irreversible situation. That situation is admitted, as we all know, by very competent authorities in the international sector.

With what we have, and everything is visible, and if the Azoreans were to manage their own interests, we would soon be better off.

Other Aspects: I do not see why natural limitations in personnel are feared for the answers that have to be given to the Azoreans in the "Independent Azores."

I do not agree that, if tomorrow we are "independent," we shall be less capable than today of taking charge of what is ours.

Proportionately, Portugal has no more or better in quantity and in quality. And "there" everything is more complex. It is necessary to feed 10 million persons.

I recall, in this connection, that Luxembourg trains all its personnel in French universities.

It is entirely a matter of using "sovereignty" to negotiate advantages for the Azores.

[Question] We go a bit farther and try to "move" Jose de Almeida with our extreme sensitivity of poets.

Doctor, if you were to go one day to Lisbon and if they asked you for a passport, would you not be shocked? There always have been (and will still be) 800 years of "motherhood."

[Answer] I do not see why a passport should be necessary, in the "Independent Azores" to go to Portugal.

The civilized nations in the West are abolishing the disturbing passport.

Portugal and the "Free Azores" would have to arrange some way to dispense with it.

[Question] Is it not possible that Dr Jose de Almeida is a romantic and a "surrealist" with regard to the Azores issue?

[Answer] I am not a surrealist.

A romantic, I studied that. It is a nineteenth century movement.

Dreamer? I am one.

Like [Martin] Luther King, I "had a dream." I am living a dream!

We all are making that dream come true, also often helped by those who are afraid of dreaming and who insist on having their feet larger than their head.

He who dreams "awake," is proceeding toward balance.

Man: "either exist or be in the world."

[Question] What has love, the warm, sweet breath, the sensitivity of a woman supporting you and helping you in that ideal for which you have been struggling for years represented for you?

[Answer] Balance, permanency, sensitivity and history.

With "her" I am a man projected physically and spiritually into the future by our children.

[Question] There was someone who stated:

There are only three events for man: birth, life and death. He feels nothing at birth, suffers on dying, forgets to live.

Doctor, do you believe that the philosopher thought well?

What do you say about that trilogy: birth, growth, death?

[Answer] I would say, rather: the event is primarily to participate consciously in the joy of existing.

And, for me, this also means the joy of participating in the work of God who created me.

[Question] What does or should "existing and being in the world" represent for you?

[Answer] Regarding all men as brothers of each other. Free, equal and respected.

MILHAFRE [Kite] With Clipped Wings

[Question] According to what we know, your newspaper has not "flown" for some time.

Is FLA possibly as united as it was, for example, in 1975?

[Answer] As you should indeed know, MILHAFRE flew again as it always has flown and it has already made a "raids."

Nationalist awareness has never been as strong as now.

"Cohesion" depends on egoisms. And it is inversely proportional!

[Question] We look -- at least with unaided eye -- at FLA and at MILHAFRE (we looked) and we only find (with no offense to anyone) one single "cra-neum," yours.

What can that mean?

[Answer] That is a concern to which I shall reply by saying: it is a question of time. Let them wait and see.

And they will have a big surprise!

"Spirits" and FLA

[Question] Every liberation movement talks especially about concrete issues and about the material needs of the people.

In its program (from what we know), FLA only refers almost always to spiritual realities, as is the concrete, constant case of the Divine Holy Spirit.

Why, doctor?

[Answer] Independence of the Azores is not a matter of engaging in guerrilla warfare and it does not even result from cultural or human frustrations.

And more concretely with regard to your question, speaking of the Divine Holy Spirit is only a way of appealing to the collective awareness of the Azoreans and for them to become more easily aware of that.

"Spirit," in the Azores, is the easiest way of reaching and mobilizing the body.

Yesterday, the Communiqué -- "Tomorrow"

[Question] Is it not possible that the communiqué distributed by the MNA/PLA was a "dark spot" in the recent visit by the president?

Can you comment on or justify the "event"?

[Answer] I do not regard the communiqué that came out on the president of the Republic as a "dark spot."

We merely have to agree that even respectable opinions may not be the best solution for carrying out a process that can in no way depend on very recent events.

[Question] Whoever talks with Dr Jose de Almeida is almost convinced or is even convinced that independence is set immediately for tomorrow, Monday, 4 August 1980.

Can it be ascertained, possibly, when the "event of the century" will break out?

(Here and as was also true with regard to other questions, the leader side-stepped the question, answering us, once more, politically and "skillfully.")

[Answer] It would be bad, if we were not to prepare ourselves every day to assume tomorrow responsibility for the Azores in independence.

FLA, Regional Government of the Azores

[Question] In the dinner in honor of Dr Sa Carneiro, the Regional Government of the Azores invited a member of FLA.

Is it possible to talk about a better understanding and a closer rapprochement between FLA and the Regional Government of the Azores?

[Answer] Starting in September 1979, the officials of the Movement decided that they should be open to dialog with other political forces in the Archipelago.

It was concluded that Nationalist Conviction and progress made in achieving independence of the Azores would not be affected at all.

It would also be one of the ways for us to determine attitudes and activities of certain groups and prominent individuals and, also, of some political parties that always try to find in us excuses for their failures and incapacities and/or the "place" for depositing the least "normal" part of their political-social conduct.

This is what justifies the new conduct of MNA/FLA with regard to the other political forces operating among us.

Final Question

[Question] If the Azores should become independent tomorrow, would the blue freedom of our sensitivity fit in the blue of their flag or would we be hanged by those "Pieces of String"?

[Answer] Blue freedom does not accept gallows, not even blue gallows.

And because blue is our favorite color, blue poets will be covered by statutes peculiar to freedom for poets.

INCREASE IN FOREIGN INVESTMENT REPORTED

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 1-7 Aug 80 p 11

[Text] From January to May 1980, 110 direct foreign investment requests were authorized, amounting to a total of 1,969,788 contos. This implies an increase of 122.5 percent, in comparison the same period last year.

The "Progress Report," published by the Foreign Investment Institute, reveals that, last April, 23 investment requests were authorized, amounting to 754,543 contos. This represents an increase of 262.3 percent, in comparison with the same month in 1979. Most of those investments (43.3 percent) were for the hotel and restaurant sector; 26.4 percent were for the wholesale trade and 15.9 percent for the manufacture of metal products and machinery, equipment and transportation material.

By country of origin, the FRG holds first place with 138,600 contos, followed by Canada with 120,000 contos.

A slight deceleration occurred during May when 15 investment requests were authorized, amounting to 281,161 contos. Close to 81.5 percent of that investment will be used for expanding activities and only 5.5 percent for new enterprises. Approximately 25.2 percent of the investments authorized in May came from EEC member countries, with the largest share, 72.2 percent, originating from EFTA members.

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CSO: 3101

CGTP-IN DELEGATION VISITS ANGOLA, COMMUNIQUE SIGNED

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 7 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] A delegation of the CGTP [General Federation of Portuguese Workers]-National Intersindical visited Angola recently and was "received by the highest authorities of the Angolan labor union movement, the MPLA-PT and the government of the People's Republic of Angola." According to a communique issued by the Federation, the representatives of the Portuguese labor union movement, who were "welcomed affectionately and enthusiastically," signed -- at the end of the visit made at the invitation of UNTA [National Union of Workers of Angola] -- a cooperation agreement with that labor union organization for the 2-year period 1980-1981 and a joint communique in which the CGTP-IN delegation stresses "the heroic, outstanding struggle waged by the Angolan working people against colonialism and the South African racist invaders whose constant acts of aggression against the People's Republic of Angola it strongly condemned."

The joint communique, which expresses the support and solidarity of the two labor union organizations with regard to the workers' struggle in several countries, especially Bolivia, South Africa, Namibia, "against colonialism, racism, fascism, imperialism and neocolonialism," states, in a certain part, that "the CGTP-IN delegation visited, during its stay in the RPA [People's Republic of Angola], various economic units and institutions of a social-cultural nature in Luanda, Luanza Norte and Huila provinces. The delegation was always received by officials and workers in an atmosphere of frank friendship and brotherhood to whom the delegation members expressed their great regret that these feelings and bonds are not understood by the present government of their country."

The UNTA delegation was headed by Pascoal Luvualu, member of the Political Bureau of the MPTA-Labor Party and secretary general of UNTA. Various members of the Central Council of the National Union of Workers of Angola were also on the delegation.

The CGTP-IN delegation, which had a meeting with "hundreds of Portuguese cooperation agents working in the People's Republic of Angola," was headed by Alvaro Rana, member of the Executive Committee of the National Secretariat, and it also included Maria Emilia Reis, of the National Secretariat, and Augusto Silva, head of the international department of CGTP-IN.

FIGURES PUBLISHED ON RESULTS OF PCP MEMBERSHIP DRIVE

Lisbon O MILITANTE in Portuguese No 61, Jul 80 pp 7-10

[Excerpts]

1 ORGANIZAÇÃO	2 Recrutamento realizado desde o começo do ano até princípios de 6/80	3 Percentagem do total
4 Organização Regional de Lisboa	4 040	23,0
5 Organização Regional de Setúbal	3 393	19,3
6 Organização Regional do Porto	2 186	12,4
7 Organização Regional do Alentejo	2 107	12,0
8 Organização Regional da Beira Litoral	1 120	6,4
9 Organização Regional do Minho	1 024	5,8
10 Organização Regional de Santarém	725	4,1
11 Organização Regional de Trás-os-Montes	613	3,5
12 Organização Regional de Leiria	515	2,9
13 Organização Regional da Beira Interior	500	2,8
14 Organização Regional do Algarve	438	2,5
15 Organização da Região Autónoma da Madeira	174	1,0
16 Organização da Região Autónoma dos Açores	129	0,7
17 Emigração e outras organizações	626	3,6
18 Operários	10 524	59,8
19 Operários industriais	8 732	49,6
20 Operários agrícolas	1 792	10,2
21 Empregados	2 737	15,6
22 Pequenos e médios agricultores	446	2,4
23 Intelectuais e técnicos	606	3,4
24 Vários	3 277	18,6

25. Menos de 30 anos	8 548	48,6
26. De 30 a 50 anos	5 969	33,9
27. Mais de 50 anos	3 073	17,5
28. Mulheres	4 266	24,3

Key:

1. Organization
2. Recruiting from 1 January to early June 1980
3. Percentage of total
4. Lisbon Regional Organization
5. Setubal Regional Organization
6. Oporto Regional Organization
7. Alentejo Regional Organization
8. Beira Coastal Regional Organization
9. Minho Regional Organization
10. Santarem Regional Organization
11. Tras-os-Montes Regional Organization
12. Leiria Regional Organization
13. Beira Interior Regional Organization
14. Algarve Regional Organization
15. Madeira Autonomous Regional Organization
16. Azores Autonomous Regional Organization
17. Emigrants and other organizations
18. Workers
19. Industrial workers
20. Agricultural workers
21. Office employees
22. Small and average farmers
23. Intellectuals and technicians
24. Miscellaneous
25. Under 30 years of age
26. From 30 to 50
27. Over 50
28. Women

Development of the Party Figures

Between the ninth congress and the national conference, the party increased its ranks by 22,305 members. The following table gives the general figures for the party organization, the number of women, the social composition and the age structure.

The date showing the figures reported to the ninth congress is 30 April 1979. The date showing the figures reported for the national conference is 5 June 1980. Moreover, an organizational evaluation was made at the end of 1979, and the results are included in the table.

	30/4/79		10.º balanço 31/12/79		5/6/80	
2 N.º de membros do Partido	164 713	%	170 718	%	187 018	%
3 Operários	94 422	57,3	98 650	57,8	108 218	57,9
4 Operários industriais	72 969	44,3	76 464	44,8	84 398	45,1
5 Operários agrícolas	21 453	13,0	22 186	13,0	23 820	12,7
6 Empregados	32 061	19,5	33 384	19,6	35 913	19,2
7 Pequenos e médios agricultores	2 810	1,7	3 017	1,8	3 350	1,8
8 Intelectuais e técnicos	8 853	5,4	8 828	5,2	9 531	5,1
9 Vários	26 567	16,1	26 839	15,7	30 006	16,0
10 Menos de 30 anos	54 877	33,3	51 860	30,4	60 086	32,1
11 De 30 a 50 anos	74 649	45,3	79 807	46,8	85 113	45,5
12 Mais de 50 anos	35 187	21,4	39 051	22,9	41 819	22,4
13 Mulheres	33 836	20,5	35 311	20,7	39 474	21,1

Key:

1. 10th evaluation--31 December 1979
2. Number of party members
3. Workers
4. Industrial workers
5. Agricultural workers
6. Office employees
7. Small and average farmers
8. Intellectuals and technicians
9. Miscellaneous
10. Under 30 years of age
11. 30-50
12. Over 50
13. Women

Some Lessons

Some lessons of interest can be drawn from this table and its comparison with that showing the regional development.

Where the social structure is concerned, the first observation is the strength of the workers' class in the ranks of the party, which strength, moreover, increased after the results of recruiting. The minor decline seen in the percentage of agricultural workers, for which the increase of industrial workers compensates, has no significance.

As to office employees, the development merits no special comment. The minor decline in the percentage in 1980 is doubtless linked with the fact that in the recruiting done, the level for employees was only 15.6 percent.

When it comes to the peasants (small and average farmers), more attention is merited. The recruiting of peasants has been a special concern in the various organizations. The results achieved in the enrollment this year reflect this concern. The percentage of peasants enrolled was 2.5 percent, a value definitely higher than that reflecting the ratio of peasants within the party ranks (1.8 percent).

But the effort made in this regard throughout the year is not adequately reflected in the most recent general figures. The explanation sought was found in the difference of criteria. In the evaluation made for the national conference current employment was given greater weight than social origin, and it does not appear that this new criterion is negative.

All of this shows that it is essential that recruiting directed toward the peasantry be strengthened in all the organizations.

The question of the criteria used to define the characteristics of the militants arises in particular in connection with social structure, given

the lesser objectivity. This is seen in particular with regard to the intellectuals and technicians. From April to December of last year the absolute figure declined, which can only be explained by the fact that some were counted among office employees. By way of compensation, there was a greater increase in their number than the recruiting indicates during this year. It is possible that in this last evaluation, some who had previously been classified otherwise were counted as intellectuals or technicians. In any case, it should be stressed that the weight of intellectuals and technicians in the enrollment (3.6 percent) is clearly less than their weight in party membership as a whole (5.1 percent), which should be taken into account by the various regional organizations.

Where the age structure is concerned, changes in opposite directions can be seen in the two time intervals shown in the table. The percentage of party members under 30 dropped at first from 33.3 percent (at the ninth congress) to 30.4 percent (by the end of the year), and then increased to 32.1 percent (beginning of June of this year).

First of all, it is necessary to note that the party membership is constantly aging. If no recruiting effort is made, not only in new party members in general but in new party members specifically under 30 years of age, the percentage of the latter will steadily decline. Therefore what happens during recruiting is of great interest. This enrollment effort oriented toward young people, which should be constant, accounted for almost half of all enrollment, 48.6 percent to be precise. It was this which made it possible to increase the percentage of young people in our party in comparison to the end-of-the-year figures, and consequently to lower the percentage of the other age groups. The recruiting of young people must always be a major guideline in our work.

Where the number of women in our ranks is concerned, the development seen was also favorable. Their weight in the party membership as a whole is increasing, although slowly. The 24.3 percent achieved during the recruiting made it possible to achieve the current percentage of 21.1 percent women in our party. It is possible and necessary to continue to increase this percentage. It is necessary to maintain the enrollment of women in the party as a major guideline in our recruiting.

Continued Party Expansion

Despite the recruiting done in the first 5 months of this year, the information gathered from the various organizations indicates that there remains a great potential for further enrollment.

In addition to the need to orient the efforts, as has been seen, toward the peasants, young people and women, there are two further aspects which it is important to stress once again.

First of all, it is necessary to continue to expand the party, particularly in the so-called difficult zones, those in which our roots are weakest. The recent enrollment shows that this must be taken into account. The fact that the Oporto Regional Organization ranks third in enrollment achieved, the fact that the Beira Coastal and Minho Regional Organizations exceeded 1,000 enrollment, the fact that the Tras-os-Montes and Beira Interior Regional Organizations, as well as the Madiera and Azores Autonomous Regional Organizations achieved greater expansion in percentage terms than the organization as a whole—all of these are positive steps showing that this is the path to be pursued.

All of the efforts in this direction, all of the contributions making it possible to expand and strengthen the organization in the difficult zones should be encouraged and put in practice.

Secondly, it is essential to bear in mind that the expansion of the organization must be accompanied by organic and personnel measures consistent with the new cells or other organizations created and the new party members. If this is not done, if steps are not taken to provide cadres for the new party members, party expansion cannot have the desired results.

The leading bodies, ranging from the regional organization leaderships, the district commissions and the council commissions to the cell secretariats, etc, should focus careful concern on this matter, which we will take up again shortly in these pages.

It is essential that the expansion of the organization, which can be continued, become a great factor in strengthening the party.

S157

CSO: 3101

PCP SENDS GREETINGS MESSAGE TO VENEZUELAN CP

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 7 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] On occasion of the holding of the Sixth Congress of the Communist Party of Venezuela, the Central Committee of the PCP has sent, on behalf of the Portuguese communists, greetings to the Central Committee of the PCV in which wishes are expressed for success in the work of the congress, which starts tomorrow and lasts until 11 August.

"The PCP has been following with great interest and spirit of solidarity," the greetings sent state, "the struggle of the working class and of the masses of the people of Venezuela for profound democratic changes that will lead to the liquidation of the power of local monopolies and of imperialism and to the creation of an independent economy serving the working people.

"The general failure of the policy and system of government is occurring. This makes the workers pay the price of the expansion of monopolistic capital resulting in massive unemployment and a worsening of their living conditions, enabling the large economic groups of the bourgeoisie to take over most of the profits from the country's oil wealth."

After expressing the combative solidarity of the Portuguese communists with the struggle of the Venezuelan communists and masses of the people on the various fronts on which it is taking place, the message of greetings continues:

"In spite of the dangers and threats to world peace stemming from the aggressive policy of imperialism, which is seeking at all costs to prevent the advance of the world revolutionary progress [sic; probably should read process], the PCP continues to evaluate the development of the international situation with optimism and confidence. In fact, in view of the worsening and intensification of the general crisis of capitalism, the

strengthening of the USSR and of the socialist camp is being witnessed. Within the framework of development of the worldwide revolutionary process, the struggle of the working class in the capitalist countries and the struggle of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America are being intensified. Recently, important victories have been achieved by the revolutionary, patriotic forces in their firm, determined struggle for national independence, democracy, social progress and socialism.

"The national and social emancipation movement is also gaining new, important development in Latin America. In solidarity with the people of Nicaragua, the PCP was able, a few days ago, to congratulate them on the first anniversary of their liberation from the dictatorship of Somoza. In solidarity with the struggle of all the people who are fighting against fascism, colonialism and imperialism, the PCP strongly condemns the gigantic military maneuvers and acts of provocation by United States imperialism directed against socialist Cuba, El Salvador and other people of Central America and the Caribbean and with which are connected the recent events in Bolivia. The PCP firmly condemns the coup d'etat provoked by the most reactionary sectors of the army in a desperate attempt to prevent continuation of the efforts being made toward the country's democratization and for the purpose of setting up a fascist dictatorship there once more.

"By unleashing the most vast and dangerous counteroffensive against the peace and security of the people since the period of the cold war, United States imperialism has given voice to a huge anticommunist, anti-Soviet campaign on the pretext of the events in Afghanistan. It is pursuing a dangerous warlike, aggressive strategic strategy in the Near East and Middle East an example of which is the Iran venture that failed. It is threatening peace and security on the European continent, especially with plans to install 600 new missiles in Western Europe.

"The PCP, which denounces the intentions and practice of imperialism, believes that, in the present international state of affairs, it is critically important to strengthen the unity of the international communist movement and the solidary action of all the democratic, anti-imperialist and peace-loving forces in ways that will make it possible to oppose the forces of reaction and of war successfully. The struggle for peace is taking on increasingly a fundamental role in the struggle of the people for democracy, national independence and socialism."

After referring to the Portuguese political situation and to the struggle in which the Portuguese communists are engaged, aiming at overthrowing the reactionary Alliance in the forthcoming election, the greetings to the PCV congress conclude:

"We shall continue to act for strengthening the bonds of fraternal friendship uniting the PCP and the PCV, on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism, certain that thus we shall contribute to an intensification of the relations of friendship between the Portuguese people and the Venezuelan people, in the interest of the common cause of democracy, progress and peace.

PCP SENDS GREETINGS MESSAGE TO COLOMBIAN

Lisbon AVANTE in Portuguese 7 Aug 80 p 2

[Text] On occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of Colombia, the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party sent the following message to the Central Committee of the Colombian [Communist] Party.

Dear Comrades:

On occasion of the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Colombia, the Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party sends its warmest fraternal greetings to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia and, through it, to all the communists, the working class, the working people of Colombia.

The history of 50 years of the Communist Party of Colombia is inseparable from the living history of the struggle of Colombian city workers, country workers, white-collar workers and intellectuals for social justice and freedom, for democracy, for peace and socialism. Fifty years of struggle during which hundreds of comrades died as a result of acts of despotism and persecution, resisting the reactionary violence perpetrated by the governments representing the oligarchy and the monopolies in the pay of imperialism.

At the present time, the Communist Party of Colombia, which is fighting tirelessly for unity of the working class and of the forces of democracy and for the vital interests of the working class and of the masses of the people against the increasing militarization of the regime, is indeed the heir of the revolutionary traditions of the Colombian people and the revolutionary vanguard of the working class of Colombia.

The Portuguese communists are in solidarity with the sister party in Colombia in its battle against repression, for the release of all political

prisoners and with the struggle of the Colombian people for an intensification of democratic freedoms and for national independence and with their more general struggle for Colombia's liberation from the domination of imperialism.

Dear comrades,

The development of the international situation is still taking place favorably to the forces of peace, social progress and socialism. The USSR and the other socialist countries, the working class in the capitalist countries and the national liberation movement have achieved considerable success in the last few years. International imperialism has unleashed a vast counteroffensive, in recent months, to try to hinder the people's struggle for liberation. In order to oppose it victoriously, the Portuguese Communist Party believes that it is of the highest importance to strengthen the unity of the international communist movement, as an irreplaceable force in the struggle in defense of peace and social progress and as a decisive factor in the cohesion of the peace-loving anti-imperialist forces on a worldwide scale.

We are confident that the Colombian people will finally triumph over the attempts made by the reactionary and fascist-leaning forces to liquidate the freedoms won so difficultly by the struggle of the masses of the people and that they will carry out their struggle for liberation from oligarchic exploitation and imperialist domination.

With every best wish for the Communist Party of Colombia to achieve greater success in its activity, the Portuguese communists will continue to act so that the bonds of friendship and solidarity existing between the Portuguese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Colombia may be strengthened and develop on the basis of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and of proletarian internationalism.

Hurrah for the 50th anniversary of the Communist Party of Colombia!

Hurrah for the Communist Party of Colombia!

The Central Committee of the Portuguese Communist Party.

10,042
CSO: 3101

ARMENIAN, KURDISH TERRORIST GROUPS UNIFY EFFORTS

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 6 Aug 80 pp 1, 17

[Text] Some Armenian gangs that murder our diplomats assert that they will take revenge upon Turkey and recover the lands that they claim belong to them. These gangs are now entering into common cause with Kurdish organizations whose activities in Turkey are minimal.

An example of this has been the fact that the Armenian Secret Army terrorist organization and the Kurdish Workers Party, an organization whose activity is minimal, have entered into common cause and issued a joint communique.

The leaders of the two groups who held a joint press conference accused Turkey of repressing the Armenian and Kurdish minorities, being the puppet of imperialism, and being fascist as well as committing acts of torture. They asserted that they will recover lands belonging to them.

The Armenians and Kurds who announced, first in a press conference held in Beirut and then Athens, that they have formed a common front against Turkey, repeated that their aim is to unite with Soviet Armenia one day.

While announcing in a joint communique prepared in Athens that the Armenian and Kurdish peoples will struggle against Israel, all imperialist Western countries, and most of all, Turkey, they maintained that the PLO supports them. Also in the communique, whose first page is devoted to the genocide Israel is perpetrating against the Palestinians, space is given to the Amnesty International report which charges that leftist students in Turkey are being tortured by the police.

Members of the two groups want to forge a unified struggle against repressive regimes and have called upon all liberation movements in the Middle East. Authorities concerned with the issue have said that the partisans in Turkey of the Kurdish Workers Party are at present very few and that the group is not active in Turkey.

CSO: 4907

RPP OFFICIAL LINKS NAP TO CRIMINAL ACTIVITY

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Aug 80 p 6

[Text] At his press conference, RPP Youth Wing chairman Hasan Belovacikli responded to NAP general chairman Alpaslan Turkes' charges concerning the RPP Youth Wing. He said, "Alpaslan Turkes has been unable to provide any proof for his charges concerning the RPP and our Youth Wing."

Belovacikli asserted, "NAP chairman Turkes has injected terror, blood, and massacre into politics and now he has become a fascist master of the lie and demagoguery." Turkes has charged that "the RPP Youth Wing has set up camps to train 50,000 armed militants." Belovacikli said, "Turkes wants to cover up and give a legal facade to the camps where the NAP is training armed activists and to pro-fascist criminal organizations."

He maintained that the conscientious and aware segments of our people are cognizant of the fascist phenomenon and the fact of the NAP. Belovacikli continued, "Despite Turkes' inability to submit proof concerning us, there are documents in the state archives on the NAP and its pro-fascists criminal organizations. The obscene declarations of NAP and UYD (Ideal Path Association) personnel are before the courts."

He said, "The NAP's relations with illegal murder rings like TIT (Turkish Revenge Brigade) and ETKO (Organization for the Salvation of Enslaved Turks) are obvious. The NAP is hand in glove with obscene fascist criminal organizations." Belovacikli enumerated the following evidence concerning the NAP:

"We are disclosing a portion of the NAP's documented criminal record. It was prepared during the Demirel government by the Police General Directorate Office of Vital Affairs and entitled 'Information Brochure 6, Activities Against the Government and Aimed at Dividing National Unity.' It is revealed in this official state document that the NAP established commando camps in 28 regions."

The document continues: "The April 1978 Cemberlitas jewel robbery was committed by persons driving a car with plates 34 ZC 443 belonging to the NAP Istanbul Province Youth Wing."

"The building at No 33 Serencebey Rize, Besiktas Cihannuma District, Istanbul is registered to Alpaslan Turkes. Some 60 UYD and NAP militants resided in this building that Turkes purchased. During searches conducted at the building, large amounts of explosive materials and guns were seized as well as arrests made of criminal organization members sought by police."

"Moreover, NAP Supreme Discipline Board member Abdurrahman Oncel was arrested by the Ankara Martial Law Command Military Court on charges of establishing a politically-oriented secret organization, armed robbery, kidnapping, and theft."

"On 26 December 1978, during the search of the NAP Zeytinburnu provincial building, explosive materials, ammunition, and handguns were found. UYD militants Adnan Cengil and Mehmet Akbal, both of whom were sought by police, were arrested."

"Miktad Simsek shot assistant professor Necdet Bulut in Trabzon and raked a coffee house in Adana. He was also involved in incidents in which four persons were killed and in which he killed several men. It was openly stated that he was quartered in NAP and UYD facilities during these operations."

"In addition, the Ankara Martial Law Command Military Court decided to open an investigation of NAP Konya deputy Ihsan Kabadayi, NAP deputy general secretary Nevzat Kosoglu, and Yasar Okuyan when it was determined that they were involved in training, arming, solicitation, and activation in the murder of assistant public prosecutor Dogan Oz in Ankara on 3 August 1979. As a result, the court decided to indict them."

CSO: 4907

RPP LOSES USAK ELECTIONS, STRATEGY EVALUATED

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 6 Aug 80 p 5

[Text] JP candidate Turgut Kalelioglu's victory by 611 votes in the election held in accordance with the Council of State's decision for the vacant office of Usak mayor has been characterized by political circles as an "unexpected outcome."

Observers said that various procedural errors by the party organization in Usak, which is renowned as an "RPP bastion," brought about this result. They evaluated the outcome in this way. "In the past the RPP provincial organization and the local administration have not provided the hoped for services to the people and have embittered them toward the party. Moreover, the tough position taken against other leftist groups has prevented these voters from going to the polls. Taking advantage of this, it was the JP that captured the mayor's office."

In this connection, RPP Usak Provincial Chairman Emin Sancar, whose views we solicited on this matter, said, "According to calculations, 53-55 percent of voters went to the polls." He, in brief, continued, "Our candidate Ibrahim Gokcay received 8840 votes for the position of mayor which was vacated after the former mayor Muhterem Kemikli was removed from office by order of the Council of State. However, JP candidate Turgut Kalelioglu mustered 9451 votes and won the seat. We have decided not to contest the results since we do not believe that such an action would yield positive results. There are several defects in the electoral law. For example, while RPP members ran 19 polls in Usak on Sunday, the JP maintained 28 polls. There are several reasons for our voters not having been able to go to the polls. Chief among them is security of life."

On the other hand, concerned circles recalled that no positive results came from RPP Deputy General Secretary Metin Somuncu and some 25 parliamentarians coming to town prior to the election and continuing their work for days. "As you know, the RPP has a margin of 2435 votes over the JP in the 1977 general elections. This was not a figure to be belittled. As for the past local election, there was a margin of 878 votes for the RPP. It is worrisome that this margin has closed in municipal elections and that the JP candidate has secured a 611 vote advantage. It is quite clear that the RPP provincial

organization has not established the requisite dialogue with democratic bodies, intellectuals, and other leftist groups. It is the voters vexation that has made the JP victorious. The resultant scenario is certainly worrisome for the RPP."

According to a statement by the provincial election board, 19,159 voters went to 84 polls in Usak on Sunday. The RPP candidate mustered 8840 votes, the JP 9541 votes. The NSP received 515 votes and 353 votes were invalidated.

JP vice chairman Necmettin Cevheri, who directed electoral operations, said the following on the result which he called a "fragmentation of the vote": "The people of Usak have taught the RPP a lesson. It is impossible to assess this election in any other way. The nation has taught them a lesson by those who make trouble."

Concerned circles stated that the unexpected voting shift away from polls in certain pro-RPP districts to the JP candidate is disturbing. They added, "RPP members who believe that the gap between the parties will be closed, hold that this election turned out in the JP's favor particularly because of the results in Karaagac district where it appears that the RPP received 59 votes to the JP's 218 votes."

CEO: 4907

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Sept. 22, 1980